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IN STATE COURTS
Richard M. Hynes*
Virginia, with a population of about seven million, has averaged more
than a million civil filings a year since the late 1980s. The overwhelming
majority of these filings seek to collect debts from consumers, and most
judgments go unpaid. Despite this apparent insolvency, civil litigation
appears to be only tenuously related to consumer bankruptcy whether one
looks at Virginia or at the nation as a whole. Nationally, the non-business
bankruptcy filing rate rose by more than 350% between 1980 and 2002,
while the civil filing rate rose by about 12%. Prior research suggests that
relatively few bankrupt debtors have been sued by their creditors in state
court, that most bankrupt debtors are drawn from the middle class, and that
bankrupt debtors own homes at nearly the same rate as the general
population. This Article finds that few civil defendants file for bankruptcy,
that civil litigation is concentrated in cities and counties with lower socio-
economic characteristics, and that civil defendants in Virginia have a
significantly lower rate of homeownership than the general population. In
other words, the bankruptcy statistics exclude many defaulting and
insolvent consumers, and these consumers may be disproportionately
drawn from the more disadvantaged segments of society.
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1. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 1, 37 (2004) (arguing that the bankruptcy filing rate is “a thermometer, recording the
economic temperature of American families”).
2. See 6 JOHN BACH MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 99 (library ed. 1915), cited in CHARLES WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 174 n.8 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1935) (“As late as 1833,
however, it was estimated that 75,000 persons were annually sent to jail for debt . . . .”). In 1833,
there were roughly fourteen million Americans, see 1 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 8 ser.A 6–8 (Bicentennial Ed.
1975) (reporting a population of approximately 14,162,000), suggesting a debtor’s prison rate of
approximately 5.3 per thousand. In 2005, there were 2,039,214 non-business bankruptcy filings,
see Am. Bankr. Inst., U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980–2006, http://www.abiworld.org/
AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=46621&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDis
play.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2007), a total that was almost certainly inflated by the rush to file
before the change in the law. See Andrew Blackman, Bankruptcy Filings Soar as Tougher Law
Nears, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2005, at D2. In 2006, non-business bankruptcy filings declined sharply
to just 597,965. Am. Bankr. Inst., supra. Even so, the 2005 total represents “just” a rate of 6.9 per
thousand—there were approximately 296,410,000 Americans in 2005. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 7 tbl.2 (126th ed. 2007), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/07statab/pop.pdf. 
3. The United States has had a permanent bankruptcy law in effect since 1898. See Act of
July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 23 (1995). Congress passed
three other bankruptcy acts in the nineteenth century, but it quickly repealed each act. See
Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248;
Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614;
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat.
99; Tabb, supra, at 13.
4. Professors Dawsey and Ausubel coined the term “informal bankruptcy,” which applies
to “non-repayment without the benefit of the formal bankruptcy process.” See Amanda E. Dawsey
& Lawrence M. Ausubel, Informal Bankruptcy 1 (Apr. 12, 2004) (unpublished working paper),
available at http://www.ausubel.com/creditcard-papers/informal-bankruptcy.pdf. For another work
examining the consumer’s choice between bankruptcy and simply refusing to pay, see generally
Sumit Agarwal et al., Exemption Laws and Consumer Delinquency and Bankruptcy Behavior: An
Empirical Analysis of Credit Card Data, 43 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 273 (2003).
5. See, e.g., AM. BANKERS ASS’N, 1997 INSTALLMENT CREDIT SURVEY REPORT 109 tbl. 90
(9th ed. 1997) (reporting that approximately 70% of banks’ consumer-credit losses occur outside
of bankruptcy). 
Bankruptcy filing statistics provide a useful  but incomplete measure1
of consumer financial distress. Although bankruptcy was relatively rare in
prior generations, default and insolvency were not. Debtor’s prison might
have been as common in early America as bankruptcy is today.  The2
United States lacked a bankruptcy law for much of its history,  and even3
today many, and probably most, consumers who fail to repay their debts
do not file for bankruptcy. Instead, they refuse to pay, and they seek relief
in a system of “informal bankruptcy.”  About two-thirds of all4
consumer-credit loans that banks charge off as uncollectible are not owed
by consumers in bankruptcy,  and a similar percentage of credit card bad5
3
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6. VISA U.S.A. INC., 1999 ANNUAL BANKRUPTCY SURVEY (2000) (reporting that two-thirds
of credit card loans charged off as uncollectible were not attributable to bankruptcy). 
7. The Philadelphia office of the Federal Reserve obtained access to a sample of credit
reports, but its scholars have not directly addressed the questions addressed in this Article. See
generally Robert B. Avery et al., Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit, 90 FED. RES. BULL.
297 (2004) [hereinafter Credit Report Accuracy] (using credit reports to attempt to quantify the
effects of credit-record-data limitations on consumers’ access to credit); Robert B. Avery et al., An
Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 47 (2003) [hereinafter
Consumer Data] (using credit reports to examine the scope and content of credit-report data); David
K. Musto, What Happens When Information Leaves a Market? Evidence from Postbankruptcy
Consumers, 77 J. BUS. 725 (2004) (using credit reports to analyze the ten-year limit on reporting
personal bankruptcy for its effects on credit access and creditworthiness); David K. Musto &
Nicholas S. Souleles, A Portfolio View of Consumer Credit 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
Working Paper No. 05-25, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=829784 (using credit reports to “measure the ‘covariance risk’ of individual consumers” to provide
a portfolio view of consumer credit). For a history of the credit-reporting industry, see Robert M.
Hunt, A Century of Consumer Credit Reporting in America, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
Working Paper No. 05-13, 2005), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/files/wps/2005/wp05-13.pdf.
8. See infra Figure II.4.
9. See infra Tables IV.2, IV.3 & IV.4 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Table IV.7.
11. See infra Table IV.9.
12. See infra Table II.2.
13. See infra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
14. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE
debt losses are charged off before the debtor files for bankruptcy.  6
It is hard to study defaulting consumers who do not choose bankruptcy.
Credit reports are not publicly available,  and defaulting consumers often7
do not want to be found. Many collection methods, such as telephone calls
and dunning letters, leave no trace in the public record. This Article
focuses on one collection device that does leave a paper trail—state
lawsuits.
Specifically, this Article examines the civil courts of the
Commonwealth of Virginia and finds a staggering amount of consumer
debt collection litigation. Since the late 1980s, Virginia’s courts have
averaged more than one civil filing each year for every five individuals,8
and the majority of these filings seek to collect debt from consumers.9
Most complaints result in a judgment for the plaintiff,  and most10
judgments are apparently never paid.  Virginia is somewhat unique; its11
rate of civil litigation is higher than that of nearly every other state.12
However, there are signs that consumer debt collection accounts for a
substantial portion of the civil filings in many states.13
Although one would expect most consumers sued in state court to be
in financial trouble, surprisingly little overlap exists between the
populations of bankrupt debtors and state court civil defendants. Prior
research suggests that less than one-third of bankrupt debtors were sued
by their creditors in state court.  This Article finds that less than 20% of14
4
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FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 305 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1989) [hereinafter AS WE FORGIVE]. 
15. See infra Table IV.10.
16. DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 48
(1971). This does not mean, however, that the threat of state court debt collection is an unimportant
determinant of consumer bankruptcy. Stanley and Girth found that 43% of debtors cited the threat
of legal action as an immediate cause of bankruptcy. Id.
17. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 274
(1974).
18. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK,
THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 3 (2000) [hereinafter FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS]
(“Bankrupts . . . represent a fair cross-section of the American middle class.”); Teresa A. Sullivan,
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An
Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 220
(2006) [hereinafter More Financial Distress]; Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race: When
Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1777, 1781–82 (2004) (“More
than 90% of those who filed for bankruptcy either attended college, had a job in the upper 80% of
all occupations in the United States, or had bought a home. Two-thirds of the families met two or
more criteria, and almost 30% met all three. . . . That is, about 91% to 93% of bankrupt white
families, Hispanic families, and black families were solidly middle class.” (footnotes omitted)).
19. AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 14, at 129 (finding that roughly 52% of bankrupt debtors
owned homes and 64% of the general population owned homes but that the declared median value
of homes in bankruptcy ($35,000) was substantially lower than that of the general population
($56,100)); More Financial Distress, supra note 18, at 225 n.39, 226 (noting that the
homeownership rates among 2001 bankrupt debtors was about 52.5% but that the declared median
home value of debtors in bankruptcy was just 60.9% of the declared median home value of the
general population).
20. See infra Part IV.C.4.
Virginia consumers sued in 2001 filed for bankruptcy by 2006, and this
remains true even if the sample is limited to those consumers who have
failed to pay a judgment.  This lack of overlap between the populations15
of bankrupt debtors and civil defendants is not new. A 1971 study found
that just 18% of bankrupt debtors cited actual litigation as an immediate
cause of their bankruptcy filing,  and a 1974 study found that just 7% of16
defendants sued for defaulting on consumer debt filed for bankruptcy.17
This lack of overlap reminds us that defaulting debtors need not choose
bankruptcy and that they have another option—they can choose informal
bankruptcy and simply refuse to pay. Because defaulting debtors need not
choose bankruptcy, we should expect to find significant differences
between bankrupt debtors and those who choose informal bankruptcy.
This Article finds some evidence consistent with this expected finding.
Prior research suggests that bankrupt debtors are overwhelmingly drawn
from the middle class.  Significantly, this prior research suggests that18
bankrupt debtors own homes at almost the same rate as the general
population, though their homes are typically worth less.  By contrast, this19
Article finds that civil defendants in Virginia have lower rates of
homeownership than bankrupt debtors and the general population.  In20
addition, this Article finds that civil litigation is disproportionately
5
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21. See infra Part III.
22. See Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State Collections: The Case of the Missing
Garnishments, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 607 (2006).
23. See infra Table II.3.
24. See, e.g., More Financial Distress, supra note 18, at 239–42, 247–51 (arguing that the
rise in bankruptcy filings is due to either an decrease in stigma or an increase in financial distress
and that there is no evidence of a decline in stigma).
25. See Hynes, supra note 22, at 635–45 (arguing that changes in job turnover, family law,
and the costs of litigation do not explain an appreciable number of the missing garnishments).
26. Numerous authors have alleged that payday lenders exploit the poor. See, e.g., Creola
Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002);
Lisa Blaylock Moss, Commentary, Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment
Transactions and the Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725, 1727 (2000).
27. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 17, at 30–34.
concentrated in cities and counties with lower median income and
homeownership rates; higher incidences of poverty and crime; and higher
concentrations of relatively young and minority residents.  In short, the21
bankruptcy statistics represent just a portion of those in financial distress,
and the preliminary data suggest that many of the insolvent debtors who
do not file may be too broke for bankruptcy.
The apparent disconnect between bankruptcy and civil litigation
extends beyond the lack of overlap between bankrupt debtors and civil
defendants. In a prior article, I showed that the rate of garnishment (an
important post-judgment remedy) in Virginia and Cook County, Illinois
declined while the bankruptcy filing rate rose sharply.  Part II of this22
Article looks at civil litigation more broadly and discovers the same basic
pattern. In the states for which I have data, the average civil filing rate
grew just 12% between 1980 and 2002, while the non-business bankruptcy
filing rate grew by more than 275%.  Thus, there is little evidence of an23
increase in consumer debt collection litigation that would match the rise
in the non-business bankruptcy filing rate.
The stability of the rate of consumer debt collection litigation creates
a puzzle for those who claim that increased financial distress caused the
rise in bankruptcy filings.  One can, however, advance a number of24
potential explanations for this puzzle. In my prior article, I addressed (and
largely dismissed) a number of these explanations.  This Article presents25
new data that allow us to consider the plausibility of other theories, and
these other theories are not so easily dismissed. For example, to the extent
that consumer debt collection litigation typically targets the poor, it may
reveal little about the financial condition of the middle class. On the other
hand, the stable rate of consumer debt collection litigation might cause us
to question claims of rising financial distress among the more
disadvantaged segments of our society. The villains of today—the payday
lender and the check-cashing stores —may simply have displaced the26
villains of yesterday—the small loan company, the direct seller, and the
low-income retailer.  27
6
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28. For simplicity, this Article ignores issues specific to secured debt.
Part I briefly describes the collection system and predicts outcomes that
are largely consistent with what I observe in the data and in the previous
literature. Part II uses data from the National Center for State Courts to
demonstrate that (i) the civil filing rate varies dramatically by state and (ii)
the civil filing rate has grown much more slowly than the non-business
bankruptcy filing rate. Part III uses data on the dispersion of civil suits
across Virginia and three other states to demonstrate that civil litigation is
concentrated in areas with more disadvantaged residents. Part IV uses
individual court filings to demonstrate that (i) the overwhelming majority
of civil litigation in Virginia attempts to collect debt from individuals, (ii)
surprisingly few complaints name the same defendant—civil litigation
reaches a very large number of Virginians, (iii) contract claims dominate
the civil docket, (iv) most filings result in a judgment, (v) though most
judgments are for less than $1,000, most are never satisfied, (vi) few
judgment debtors seek protection in bankruptcy, but creditors appear to
abandon legal procedures to collect their judgments after one or two years,
and (vii) the homeownership rate of civil defendants in Virginia is
probably much lower than the homeownership rates of bankrupt
Americans and the general population. Part V concludes.
I.  THE ROLE OF STATE COURTS IN THE COLLECTION PROCESS
Many debtors lack an accurate understanding of the laws governing
debt collection, and debtors and their creditors may behave irrationally.
Defaulting consumers may fail to address their insolvency, hoping that
their problems will resolve themselves. Their creditors may fail to listen
to reason, stubbornly pursuing debts that the consumer just cannot pay.
However, if we assume that everyone behaves rationally and understands
the law, we can generate implications that are reasonably consistent with
what we observe in the world.
A.  A Brief Description of the Collection Process
Assume a consumer experiences financial difficulty and must decide
whether to pay an unsecured obligation such as a credit card or dentist
bill.  The consumer could try to convince his creditors to accept a lower28
payment, but this negotiation may prove difficult if he owes debt to
multiple creditors. Each creditor will want the other creditors to provide
the forgiveness. In addition, the negotiation will largely be driven by the
legal environment that will govern if the parties cannot reach an
agreement. 
7
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29. The consumer would choose among several bankruptcy chapters, but this Article ignores
this level of detail.
30. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 2007).
31. See id. § 524. Some claims, such as family-law claims, are exempt from the discharge.
Id. § 523(a).
32. See id. § 541.
33. The bankruptcy code provides specific property exemptions, but the code also allows
each state to “opt-out” and deny its citizens the right to use these exemptions. See id. § 522. About
two-thirds of the states have done so. See Richard M. Hynes et al., The Political Economy of State
Property Exemption Laws, 47 J.L. & ECON. 19, 24 (2004). Section 522 of the code also permits
each debtor to use the exemptions that would be available in a state collection proceeding. See 11
U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(3)(A). For examples of specific state exemptions, see infra notes 61–64, 71 and
accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. TRS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
TRUSTEE PROGRAM: PRELIMINARY REPORT ON CHAPTER 7 ASSET CASES 1994 TO 2000, at 7 (2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/library/chapter07/docs/assetcases/
Publicat.pdf (“Historically, the vast majority (about 95 to 97 percent) of chapter 7 cases yield no
assets.”). 
35. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1930 (West 2007) (providing that the fee to be paid to the clerk of the
court for filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy is $245); see also U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filing Fees,
http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/fees.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) (providing that
the filing fees for Chapter 7 bankruptcy total $299, which includes the trustee fee and
administrative fee).
36. BankruptcyAction.com, Bankruptcy Information, FAQ’s, Chapter 7 and 13 Information,
http://www.bankruptcyaction.com/questions.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
37. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 605, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2004).
38. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(8) (West 2007).
The consumer may decide to file for bankruptcy.  A bankruptcy filing29
would invoke the automatic stay and prevent his creditors from attempting
to collect.  If all of the requirements of bankruptcy are met, the debtor30
would be given a discharge that would free his future income from the
claims of nearly all of his creditors.  In theory, the debtor’s property31
would be distributed to his creditors,  but federal and state laws provide32
substantial exemptions.  In practice, distributions to general creditors33
from non-exempt assets are extremely rare.  Bankruptcy has costs,34
however. Fees for the most common form of bankruptcy, Chapter 7, are
now $299,  and a lawyer may charge an additional $1,000 to $2,000 to35
complete the necessary paperwork.  The bankruptcy filing will remain in36
the consumer’s credit file for ten years,  and the law prohibits the37
consumer from obtaining another bankruptcy discharge for the next eight
years.38
A defaulting debtor has another option—he can simply refuse to pay
and wait for his creditors to pursue him. The decision to wait is not
irreversible; the consumer can file for bankruptcy at any time if the
pressure from his creditors becomes too great. This pressure may begin
with a reminder of the obligations, and the ensuing telephone calls and
letters may not be so gentle in tone. Many large creditors will routinely
8
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39. See Consumer Data, supra note 7, at 50.
40. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 605, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2004).
41. See Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2000) (providing
rules to which “debt collectors” must adhere in collecting debts). Section 1692a defines “debt
collector” as “any person who uses . . . interstate commerce . . . in any business the principal
purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to
collect . . . debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” Id. § 1692a(6). Note that an
attorney may be deemed to be a debt collector. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 292, 294 (1995)
(finding that an attorney who regularly attempts to collect debts for a client, even if the collection
is indirect through litigation, is a debt collector according to the FDCPA).
42. For a brief summary of these state laws, see ROBERT J. HOBBS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 741–49 (5th ed. 2004).
43. The lender may to be unable to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition by itself and may
be unable to file in conjunction with other creditors. Unless a consumer has fewer than twelve
qualifying creditors, at least three creditors must file the petition and the sum of their claims must
exceed $13,475. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(b)(1) (West 2007). Even if the consumer has fewer than
twelve creditors, the lender must be owed at least $13,475. See id. § 303(b)(2). Involuntary cases
are very rare. H.R. REP. NO. 108-110, at 2 (2003) (“[F]ewer than 1 percent of all bankruptcy case
filings are commenced involuntarily.”). If the lender resides in a state different than that of the
consumer, the lender could sue in federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1332 (West 2007). However, federal courts will not hear diversity suits if the amount in
controversy is less than $75,000. Id. Thus, the lender will almost certainly file in state court.
report the consumer’s account activity to the credit bureaus,  and a record39
of the default will remain in the consumer’s creditor report for seven
years.  The creditor might hire a collection agency or  sell the debt to a40
distressed-debt buyer. The collection agency or distressed-debt buyer will
apply additional pressure and will likely report the debt to the credit
bureaus. The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA) limits the
collection efforts of these third parties (the collection agency and the
distressed-debt buyer).  If the original creditor is collecting, however, the41
consumer will need to look to state law for protection.42
Some consumers never pay regardless of who applies the pressure. The
lender (or its assignee) must decide whether to seek a judgment in state
court  or to abandon collection efforts and save the expense of litigation.43
The cost of filing a claim varies significantly from state to state. The filing
9
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44. ROBERT A. PUSTILNIK ET AL., DEBT COLLECTION FOR VIRGINIA LAWYERS: A SYSTEMATIC
APPROACH ¶ 7.302 (2d ed. Supp. 2006) (“The cost of initiating an action in general district court
is about one-third of the cost of a circuit court action.”). The filing fee for a civil complaint for a
claim greater than $200 in James City County/Williamsburg General District Court is $34 (plus an
additional $12 for service on each person). Telephone Call to James City County/Williamsburg
Courthouse, Automated Information System, 757-564-2400 (Sept. 23, 2007). The filing fee in
James City County/Williamsburg Circuit Court for a legal complaint up to $50,000, a contract
complaint up to $50,000, a detinue action up to $50,000, and an unlawful detainer action up to
$50,000 is $77. James City County/Williamsburg Circuit Court, Civil Fee Schedule,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/circuit_fees/civilfees/james_city_county~williamsburg.pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2007).
45. Dist. Court of Md., Civil Cost Schedule and Other Charges,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/district/forms/civil/dccv12.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
46. Superior Court of Ca. County of San Benito, Statewide Civil Fee Schedule,
http://www.sanbenito.courts.ca.gov/filing_fees.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) (providing a $100
filing fee for a claim filed by a person who has filed more than twelve small claims within the
previous year).
47. The Office of the Clerk of the Court in DuPage County, Ill., Law Division Filing Fees,
http://www.dupageco.org/courtclerk/generic.cfm?doc_id=389 (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
48. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-94.01 (2007).
49. See, e.g., id. § 16.1-88.03. In Virginia, a corporation may designate an agent to file suit
in general district court; the corporation is not required to hire an attorney. Id.
50. Fair Debt Collections Practices Act § 811, 15 U.S.C. § 1692i (2000). If the debt collector
sues for an interest in real property, the collector may also bring the action where the property is
located. Id. The FDCPA applies to outside counsel when counsel is a debt collector. Heintz v.
Jenkins, 514 U.S. 292, 294 (1995).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F) (2000).
52. Virginia allows the creditor to sue the consumer in the city or county in which the
consumer resides, maintains his principal place of employment, or regularly conducts substantial
business activity. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262 (2007). More significantly, Virginia allows the
creditor to file where the contract was breached, id. § 8.01-262(4) (allowing suit where “the cause
of action . . . arose”), and courts have interpreted this to mean the location of the creditor’s home
office because that was where payment was due. See, e.g., Vill. Auto Ctr. v. Apple Auto Glass &
Mirror, Inc., 51 Va. Cir. 471, 472 (Vir. Cir. Ct. 2000). Additionally, Virginia courts generally
respect agreements as to venue. See, e.g., Paul Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 397 S.E.2d
804, 807 (Va. 1990). Some states restrict the plaintiff’s choice of venue significantly. See, e.g.,
fee for a $1,000 claim is as low as $34 in Virginia  and $30 in Maryland,44 45
and as high as $100 in California  and $130 in Illinois.  Victorious46 47
creditors may add these costs to the amount owed,  but this means little48
if the creditor fails to collect the judgment.
Lawsuits may also entail substantial administrative costs. State law
may require the creditor to hire a lawyer,  and the creditor will need to sue49
in the appropriate court. If the FDCPA applies, the creditor must sue the
consumer in a judicial district in which the consumer “resides at the
commencement of the action” or “signed the contract sued upon.”  The50
FDCPA does not, however, apply to suits brought by the creditor who
originated the loan or a creditor who purchased the loan before it was in
default.  Some states, including Virginia, have more liberal venue rules51
and allow the creditor to sue the consumer where the creditor is located.52
10
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ALA. CODE § 6-3-2 (2007) (“All actions on contracts, except as may be otherwise provided, must
be commenced in the county in which the defendant or one of the defendants resides if such
defendant has within the state a permanent residence.”); GA. CONST. art. VI, § II, para. VI (“All
other civil cases, except juvenile court cases as may otherwise be provided by the Juvenile Court
Code of Georgia, shall be tried in the county where the defendant resides . . . .”).
53. See infra note 270 and accompanying text (noting that Richmond is the forum of choice
for a major credit card issuer).
54. See Consumer Data, supra note 7, at 67.
55. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 605, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
56. See PUSTILNIK ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 7.1803. 
57. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 697.310 (West 2007) (“Except as otherwise provided
by statute, a judgment lien on real property is created under this section by recording an abstract
of a money judgment with the county recorder.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-380a (2007) (“A
judgment lien, securing the unpaid amount of any money judgment, including interest and costs,
may be placed on any real property by recording, in the town clerk's office in the town where the
real property lies, a judgment lien certificate, signed by the judgment creditor or his attorney or
personal representative . . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.02 (West 2007) (“Any judgment or
decree rendered by any court of general jurisdiction, including district courts of the United States,
within this state shall be a lien upon lands and tenements of each judgment debtor within any
county of this state from the time there is filed in the office of the clerk of the court of common
pleas of such county a certificate of such judgment . . . .”).
58. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-462 (2007); PUSTILNIK ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 8.501.
59. See PUSTILNIK ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 8.501. 
60. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-459 (2007).
Large creditors can (and do) sue Virginia residents from across the state
in a single court, greatly reducing the creditors’ costs of litigation.  53
Credit bureaus typically do not note civil suits in their files, but they do
record judgments.  These judgments remain in the consumer’s credit54
report for seven years or until enforcement of the judgment is barred by
the statute of limitations.  A judgment does not guarantee payment,55
however, and the plaintiff must take further action to enforce its judgment.
One typically thinks of bankruptcy as the refuge for those who cannot pay,
but non-bankruptcy law also protects the insolvent by limiting the
enforcement of judgments.
Consider first the ability of a plaintiff to levy on real property owned
by a consumer. Virginia law allows the plaintiff to obtain a lien on real
property by recording the judgment in the circuit court of the county or
city in which the property is located and paying a small fee (currently
about $8).  Most other states have similar laws or allow the judgment to56
serve as a lien against the defendant’s property.  Often the lien will be57
sufficient to induce the defendant to repay because the lien limits the
defendant’s ability to sell or refinance his home. The plaintiff may also
force a sale of the home to satisfy the lien. In Virginia this requires another
suit,  and the process is difficult, expensive, and risky.  Creditors with58 59
senior liens must be paid before the plaintiff receives any of the
proceeds,  and Virginia law allows a consumer to exempt $5,00060
($11,000 for a family of four) of any property from attachment and
11
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61. See id. § 34-4 (exempting $5,000 for each householder plus $500 for each dependent
child). “Householder” is defined as “any resident of Virginia.” Id. § 34-1.
62. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.010 (2007) (allowing a homestead exemption up to
$54,000); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.730 (West 2007) (allowing a homestead exemption between
$50,000 and $150,000, depending on the circumstances of the debtor); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-
1003 (2007) (allowing a homestead exemption up to $100,000).
63. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 2007); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4, cl.
a1.
64. See, e.g., PUSTILNIK ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 8.604 (stating that under Virginia law,
“property held as tenants by the entireties is exempt from the claims of individual creditors of the
owners of the property”). An excellent, though somewhat dated, description of this doctrine can be
found in Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294–95 (Haw. 1977).
65. In Virginia, this is the writ of fieri facias, which costs the plaintiff an additional $37. See
PUSTILNIK ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 8.102 (“The clerk of the general district court will collect a total
of $37: $12 for issuing the writ and $25 for the sheriff’s service.”).
66. See id. ¶ 8.113.
67. Id.
68. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (2007) (enumerating items that are exempt under the poor-
debtor’s exemption); PUSTILNIK ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 8.103 (listing exemptions applying to the
third-party debts of an individual, including “(i) almost all household furnishings and appliances
up to a value of $5,000; (ii) wearing apparel up to a value of $1,000; (iii) tools and equipment used
in the householder’s business up to a value of $10,000; and (iv) $2,000 in equity in a vehicle not
used in business”). These exemptions, like the real property exemptions mentioned above, are
typically the same exemptions available in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) (West 2007). The
Fourth Amendment may also limit the ability of a sheriff to search for non-exempt property. For
a discussion of this issue, see Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 603, 634 (2006).
execution.  Many states allow the defendant to exempt much more home61
equity,  and in a few states the plaintiff simply may not attach a lien to the62
defendant’s home.  Virginia and a number of other states also effectively63
exempt the home from attachment by a plaintiff that has a claim against
only one spouse if the property is held in the form of tenancy by the
entireties.  Finally, many defendants do not own any real estate at all, and64
the plaintiff must look to the defendant’s personal property for
satisfaction.
The satisfaction of a judgment from the defendant’s personal property
typically requires two steps. First, the plaintiff must ask the court to issue
a writ ordering the sheriff to levy on the defendant’s personal property.65
If the defendant still fails to pay the judgment, the plaintiff may force a
sale of the property and apply the proceeds to satisfy the debt.  This66
remedy is seldom used in Virginia.  Like all other states, Virginia67
exempts some of the defendant’s personal property from seizure, and these
exemptions will protect the meager assets of many defaulting debtors.  In68
addition, the seized property may fail to generate much profit after
deducting the costs of sale. Finally, creditors may use this remedy
infrequently because a better remedy is available: garnishment.
12
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69. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-511 (2007).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000). Funds deposited in the debtor’s bank account may also be
exempt if they are from social security or disability payments or even the debtor’s wages. See, e.g.,
VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34 (2007); PUSTILNIK ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 8.601.
71. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 222.11 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-4.29 (2007); id. § 135-9;
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8127 (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-104 (2006); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 63.004 (Vernon 2007).
72. Virginia protects the greater of 75% of the debtor’s take-home pay or forty times the
federal minimum wage. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (2007).
73. See PUSTILNIK ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 8.308. 
74. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-506 (2007). 
75. See id. § 8.01-508.
76. See id. 
77. In Virginia, the plaintiff must notify the court to release the judgment within thirty days
of payment. Id. § 8.01-454.
The consumer’s most liquid assets are likely to be claims against third
parties—a checking or savings account at a bank or unpaid wages in the
hands of an employer. A plaintiff with a judgment can force a bank or an
an employer to pay the plaintiff instead of the consumer by bringing a
garnishment action.  There are, however, limits on the amount of bank69
deposits or wages that a plaintiff may seize. Federal law prohibits a
general creditor from seizing more than the lesser of 25% of the debtor’s
take-home pay or the amount by which the debtor’s weekly take-home pay
exceeds thirty times the federal minimum wage.  Some states further limit70
wage garnishment or even prohibit it altogether,  but Virginia’s law is71
only marginally more restrictive than the federal law.  Bank deposits are72
also protected if the debtor can show that such deposits were exempt
wages or exempt income support payments.73
A creditor is unable to use garnishment if the debtor has no bank
account and works for cash compensation. In addition, the creditor might
not know the identity of the defendant’s employer or the location of the
defendant’s bank account. Even if the plaintiff collected this information
when it extended the loan, this information may be inaccurate at the time
of default. Assuming the plaintiff can find the defendant, the plaintiff may
use an interrogatory to compel the defendant to come to court and disclose
the location of his assets.  If the defendant fails to attend the74
interrogatory, the plaintiff may ask the court to issue an order compelling
the defendant to show cause for why he failed to appear at the
interrogatory.  If the defendant fails to appear to show cause, the plaintiff75
may ask the court to issue a capias (essentially an action for contempt of
court) to have the defendant arrested.  76
Courts usually rely on the plaintiff to tell the court when the defendant
has paid.  However, the penalty for failing to report payment is often77
small. The penalty for failing to notify the Virginia courts is just $50, and
this penalty is imposed only if the debtor makes a written request and the
13
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78. Id. 
79. See 1 WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 6:79 (rev.
ed. Supp. 2007). 
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.55(B)(2) (2007).
81. To extend the limitations period for general district court judgments, Virginia plaintiffs
may docket an abstract of the judgment in circuit court and thereby extend the life of the judgment
to twenty years. See id. § 8.01-251(G).
82. See BROWN, supra note 79, § 6:79. A few states prohibit plaintiffs from pursuing
judgments indefinitely. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-20-35 (2007) (requiring the cancellation
of all judgments or renewals after twenty years); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.194 (2005) (limiting a
judgment lien to ten years with one renewal permitted); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.210 (2006)
(limiting a judgment lien to ten years with one renewal permitted).
83. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“[Bankruptcy] gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of
bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of pre-existing debt.”).
creditor fails to act within ten days.  As a result, court records almost78
certainly undercount the number of paid judgments.
Every state imposes a statute of limitations on judgments;  Virginia79
general district court judgments remain effective for ten years.  Plaintiffs80
may, however, extend the life of their judgments.  As a result, plaintiffs81
in nearly every state may, in theory, pursue an unpaid judgment
indefinitely.  The need to free the debtor from this cloud of liability is the82
primary justification for bankruptcy’s “fresh start.”83
B.  Implications: Choosing Bankruptcy and Choosing Suit
Studies of bankrupt debtors and civil defendants examine just a fraction
of the consumers who default on their obligations. In addition, bankruptcy
and civil filings are the products of conscious choice, and therefore the
debtors and creditors who use these legal processes will probably be quite
different than those who do not. To understand the nature of these biases,
consider the consumer’s decision to file for bankruptcy and the creditor’s
decision to sue.
1.  The Debtor’s Choice to File for Bankruptcy
If a consumer decides not to pay his debts, at least four factors are
likely to affect the choice between bankruptcy and informal bankruptcy
(simply refusing to pay): the consumer’s wealth and income, his access to
credit, his financial stability, and his amount and types of debt. Each of
these factors suggests that I should find greater concentrations of middle-
class debtors in bankruptcy and greater concentrations of poor debtors in
informal bankruptcy. The empirical evidence in the literature and in Parts
III and IV of this Article supports this proposition.
First consider a middle-class consumer who faces an unexpected
medical bill of a few hundred dollars. If the consumer has a limited
14
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84. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205, 206, 223–28 (1998) (arguing that many consumers do not file for bankruptcy
because they wish to preserve the option to do so in the future).
86. See FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at 238 (“Stability is the essence of the middle
class.”).
87. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
89. See AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 14, at 305.
amount of other debt, bankruptcy is obviously a poor choice. A bankruptcy
filing may require more than $2,000 in attorney’s and filing fees,  and the84
filing will not allow the consumer to evade payment if he has significant
non-exempt assets that may be seized in bankruptcy. Even if the amount
of debt that would be discharged exceeds the monetary cost of filing, the
consumer may wish to preserve the option to file for bankruptcy in the
future if his condition worsens.  Perhaps more importantly, the consumer85
may fear the damage that a bankruptcy filing would cause to his credit
rating. 
Informal bankruptcy is also likely to be a poor strategy. The label
“middle class” evokes images of stability,  and this stability makes the86
debtor vulnerable to a creditor’s collection techniques. A stable debtor is
easy to locate, and thus a creditor can easily apply non-judicial pressure
(dunning letters and telephone calls) or serve process for a suit. If the
consumer owns a home, the creditor can attach a lien and wait until the
debtor wants to sell the home or refinance.  If the consumer has a steady87
job or a bank account, the creditor can use garnishment to enforce its
judgment.  To the extent that these remedies are available and effective,88
simply refusing to pay will only delay payment and force the consumer to
incur additional stress and court fees. Paying the debt is likely to be the
consumer’s best option, especially if he has easy access to credit and can
manage short-term cash needs. 
Access to credit may, of course, lead to larger debt burdens, and the
consumer may eventually decide that he cannot repay his obligations. The
larger debts are likely to render informal bankruptcy a less attractive
option because the larger debts will increase creditors’ incentive to collect.
As a result, bankruptcy becomes relatively more attractive. The consumer
may decide that spending $2,000 on filing and attorney’s fees is a bargain
if it allows him to avoid repaying large unsecured debt and stops the phone
calls and other efforts of determined creditors. Moreover, once the
consumer determines that a creditor’s threats are credible, waiting to file
for bankruptcy makes little sense. This may help explain why Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook find few civil lawsuits and garnishments in the
files of bankrupt debtors  and why other scholars find that state-law89
remedies such as garnishment are quite significant in determining whether
15
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90. See, e.g., Agarwal et al., supra note 4, at 278; Dawsey & Ausubel, supra note 4, at 9,
24–25.
91. There is some support for this theory in the literature. In 1971, Stanley and Girth found
that just 18% of bankrupt debtors cited actual legal action as an immediate cause of bankruptcy but
that 43% cited threatened legal action, such as garnishment. See STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 16,
at 47–48.
92. See, e.g., Credit Report Accuracy, supra note 7, at 306 (suggesting that defaults on
medical debt are less important to credit evaluators because these defaults may be of little use in
predicting payments on other debt). As a result, future creditors may pay less attention to defaults
on medical debt.
93. See Consumer Data, supra note 7, at 50.
94. See id. at 67–68.
95. See Todd B. Hilsee et al., Hurricanes, Mobility, and Due Process: “The Desire to
Inform” Requirement for Effective Class Action Notice Is Highlighted by Katrina, 80 TUL. L. REV.
1771, 1791–92 (2006). 
96. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 17, at 14–21, 325–26.
a consumer will file for bankruptcy.  The threat of garnishment may be90
sufficient to drive consumers into bankruptcy.  91
Now consider the choice of a more impoverished debtor. Unless this
debtor can find assistance from legal aid, he may be unable to gather the
cash necessary to file for bankruptcy. On the other hand, the debtor’s
poverty may make a simple refusal to pay a more viable alternative. If the
debtor lacks a home, a steady job, and a bank account, there may be little
that the creditor can do to enforce its judgment. The judgment will appear
on the debtor’s credit report, but the debtor may hope that a judgment for
an unpaid medical bill will have less effect than a default on a debt to a
financial institution.  In fact, the debtor may hope that his default will not92
affect his credit rating at all. Many small vendors and service providers do
not regularly report payment histories directly to the credit bureaus;  the93
credit bureaus will learn of the default only if the creditor assigns the
account to a collection agency or obtains a judgment.  Moreover, these94
creditors might not know the consumer’s social security number, and the
credit bureaus may have difficulty identifying the debtor if he moves.
Some scholars estimate that credit bureaus cannot adequately track address
changes for close to half of lower-income Americans because these
individuals do not use traditional forms of credit.  In any case, the debtor95
may not have enough cash or credit available to repay the debt, and
informal bankruptcy may be his only option.
There is some evidence that bankrupt debtors and debtors who default
without filing for bankruptcy were significantly different as far back as the
late 1960s. Professor David Caplovitz studied a group of consumers who
were sued in state court in 1967 (a subset of those who defaulted and did
not file for bankruptcy), and, based on a consideration of income,
education, age, and race, he described the individuals he studied as
“marginal poor.”  Stanley and Girth studied a group of consumers who96
filed for bankruptcy in 1964, and, based on variables similar to those used
16
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97. See STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 16, at 42–45.
98. For example, Professor Caplovitz tells us the percentage of defaulting debtors who
graduated from high school, CAPLOVITZ, supra note 17, at 19, but Stanley and Girth present data
on education in a manner that does not allow the computation of this statistic, see STANLEY &
GIRTH, supra note 16, at 42–43. In addition, the two studies focused on different locations with
only some overlap, and any difference may be due to geography rather than the legal process. See
CAPLOVITZ, supra note 17, at 323–24 (studying cases from Philadelphia, New York, Detroit, and
Chicago); STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 16, at 6 (studying cases from the federal districts of
Northern Ohio, Northern Alabama, Maine, Northern Illinois, Oregon, Western Texas, Southern
New York, and Southern California).
99. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
100. See AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 14, at 91 (“The debtors in bankruptcy work alongside
other Americans, in roughly the same industries and jobs, and with nearly the same general
occupational prestige . . . .”).
101. See FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at 53.
102. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
103. See FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at 46. 
104. Id. at 131 (finding that credit card debt typically comprised one half of all unsecured
debt).
105. See Agarwal et al., supra note 4; Dawsey & Ausubel, supra note 4. 
106. See Agarwal et al., supra note 4, at 278; Dawsey & Ausubel, supra note 4, at 23–25.
by Professor Caplovitz, they described their consumers as “a picture of
neither poverty nor instability.”  Unfortunately, however, the data97
collected by Stanley and Girth are not directly comparable to the data
collected by Professor Caplovitz, and thus one cannot say for certain
whether the two groups were very different at the time.98
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, continuing and expanding on the
work of Stanley and Girth, stress that the overwhelming majority of
bankrupt families can be fairly described as “middle class.”  Though99
bankrupt debtors earned smaller incomes than the general population, they
had roughly comparable levels of occupational prestige,  years of100
education,  and homeownership rates.  Whites were slightly101 102
overrepresented in their sample of bankrupt debtors; though blacks were
overrepresented as well, all other minority groups were
underrepresented.  They also found that credit card debts and other103
obligations to financial institutions comprise a very large portion of the
amount bankrupt debtors owed.  Unfortunately, the existing literature104
does not offer a modern analog to the work of Professor Caplovitz that
would allow us to compare bankrupt debtors with those debtors who chose
informal bankruptcy.
The literature does, however, offer two recent studies of consumers
who default on credit card debt whether or not they file for bankruptcy.105
Both studies find that consumers are more likely to choose informal
bankruptcy if state law limits the remedies available to their creditors
outside of bankruptcy.  One of the studies, by Professors Dawsey and106
Ausubel, goes a step further and shows that individuals who live in areas
with larger African-American populations are less likely to file for
17
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107. See Dawsey & Ausubel, supra note 4, at 3–4.
108. Id. at 4.
109. Id. at 13.
110. Id. at 19.
111. Id. at 13–14.
112. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
113. See STATE CORP. COMM’N, SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: PAYDAY LENDER LICENSEES CHECK CASHERS 8 (2005), available at
http://scc.virginia.gov/division/banking/forms/ar04-05.pdf.
bankruptcy after defaulting.  Professors Dawsey and Ausubel do not107
explain why individuals who live in predominantly African-American
neighborhoods are more likely to choose informal bankruptcy, though they
hint that this may be due to a greater use of informal economic practices,
such as the cash wage payment, and the use of check-cashing institutions
instead of bank accounts.  Professors Dawsey and Ausubel do not108
exclude the possibility that race serves as a proxy for other variables such
as income or job security.
This Article complements these prior studies. The prior studies are
limited to credit card accounts, and the Dawsey and Ausubel study is
further limited to holders of “gold” credit cards.  Significantly,109
Professors Dawsey and Ausubel estimate that the holders of these gold
cards have above-average credit scores.  To test whether the bankruptcy110
statistics miss a substantial amount of insolvency among disadvantaged
groups, however, I need data that include these disadvantaged groups. In
addition, Dawsey and Ausubel focus solely on a failure to repay credit
card debt,  but borrowers may choose to default on other obligations for111
strategic reasons. For example, the literature on credit reports suggests that
defaults on medical obligations carry less of a penalty than defaults on
financial obligations.112
Unlike the studies of credit card defaults, however, this Article focuses
only on those consumers who are sued in state court. This Article’s count
of state civil actions therefore undercounts those who choose informal
bankruptcy because some consumers who choose informal bankruptcy are
not sued. In addition, the consumers who are sued may differ significantly
from those who are not. The next section considers the creditor’s choice
to sue so that I can predict the nature of this bias.
2.  The Creditor’s Choice to Sue
The above analysis suggests that many defaulting debtors who choose
informal bankruptcy are effectively judgment proof. Why then do so many
creditors bother to sue? In many cases they do not. For example,
Virginia’s Bureau of Financial Institutions reports that in 2005 payday
lenders charged off 76,546 returned checks as uncollectible but sued only
9,039 borrowers.  The civil litigation statistics may represent just the tip113
of the informal-bankruptcy iceberg.
18
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114. For a description of the collection process, see Robert M. Hunt, Collecting Consumer
Debt in America, FED. RES. BANK PHILA. BUS. REV., Q2 2007, at 11, 12–16, available at
http://philadelphiafed.org/files/br/2007/q2/hunt_collecting-consumer-debt.pdf.
115. Id. at 13–14.
116. Significantly, this rate of eleven cents on the dollar equals the average purchase price of
credit card debt reported by Mann and Hawkins. Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until
Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 863 n.24 (2007).
117. In Virginia, the filing fee is just $34 for a claim greater than $200 and $29 for a claim less
than $200; the sheriff will serve process for an additional $12. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text.
The decision to sue is easier to understand if civil litigation is placed
within the larger context of consumer debt collection. Before suing,
creditors are likely to expend considerable effort trying to collect the debt
themselves, and many creditors will have sent the debt to a collections
agency or sold the debt to a third party.  The median account assigned to114
a debt-collection agency is $440, the median amount recovered is $68, and
the median commission charged by a collection agency is 28%.115
Consumer debt collection is a low-margin business; the above numbers
suggest that net recovery rates are usually around eleven cents on the
dollar.  116
Viewed in this light, the decision to sue appears less puzzling.
Creditors will sue as long as the expected net return is greater than zero
and greater than the next best alternative. Not all consumers are
completely judgment proof, and the creditor may hope to recover some
money through garnishment or other means. Even if the creditor would not
collect immediately, it might reason that a judgment would serve as an
option that would pay off should the consumer’s condition improve before
the statute of limitations runs. This option may yield a significant return
if the creditor is owed a large amount. This option would, of course, come
at the expense of the debtor. However, the value of this option might not
exceed the costs of filing for bankruptcy, and the debtor might lack the
liquidity needed to settle with the creditor at the time of suit.
This theory yields testable implications. First, although Virginia law
offers fairly strong creditor remedies, one should expect a low rate of
satisfaction of judgments because the cost of filing suit is relatively low
and creditors will be willing to sue when there is just a small chance of
collecting.  Second, the sample of civil defendants should be less likely117
to be judgment proof than the larger population of debtors who default
without filing for bankruptcy; the civil defendants should not necessarily
represent the poorest segment of society. Moreover, the difference
between the population of civil defendants and the larger group who chose
informal bankruptcy is likely to increase as the various costs of filing suit
increase. As a result, my sample of civil defendants in Virginia is unlikely
to be representative of civil defendants in states where it is more costly for
the creditor to sue or harder for creditors to enforce their judgments. On
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118. Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Topic 453—Bad Debt
Deduction, http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc453.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
119. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An
Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 569 (2006).
120. See infra Part IV.C.3.
121. See, e.g., Anthony Ramirez, SPENDING IT; Name, Resume, References. And How’s Your
Credit?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997, § 3, at 8.
the other hand, our sample of civil defendants in Virginia should be more
representative of the population that chooses informal bankruptcy than the
civil defendants in these other states because unpaid Virginia creditors
should be more likely to sue.
A creditor may decide to sue even if it knows that its debtor is
judgment proof and will always be judgment proof. Some creditors may
believe, perhaps erroneously, that they need a judgment for tax or
regulatory purposes. The Internal Revenue Service does not require that
the creditor sue to demonstrate that a debt is worthless,  but some118
creditors may believe that they need to sue. Some have alleged that federal
Medicare-related laws encourage hospitals to use aggressive debt-
collection techniques, but the federal government denies this.  The data119
allow one to test whether medical creditors behave differently than other
creditors. The data do not provide strong evidence that they do.120
Even absent perceived regulatory requirements, a creditor may still
decide to sue a judgment-proof consumer because the judgment will
impose costs on the consumer by damaging the consumer’s credit rating.
Note that a damaged credit rating does more than merely raise the
consumer’s cost of credit. A damaged credit score can make it difficult to
rent an apartment, find a job, or even purchase automobile insurance.121
Thus, creditors may routinely sue their debtors to maintain a reputation as
a “tough” debt collector and discourage other debtors from defaulting. The
filing of the suit may also help convince the current defendant to pay. As
noted above, credit reports typically do not record the filing of the lawsuit,
but they do record judgments. Therefore, a civil filing serves as a credible
threat to inflict harm on the defendant and may induce the defendant to
pay.
The threat-based theories of suit yield empirical predictions, and this
Article tests some of these predictions below. Again, these theories
suggest that many judgments will remain unpaid. A creditor that wants a
reputation for tough behavior must sue even when recovery is very
unlikely. If the civil filing serves as a threat, actual judgments would
represent cases when the threat failed to induce payment. 
The theories also suggest that different creditors should exhibit
different behavior. Many large financial creditors regularly report their
debtor’s payment history to the credit bureaus, so these creditors do not
need to file suit to credibly threaten to damage the debtor’s reputation. I
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122. See Consumer Data, supra note 7, at 68–70.
123. See infra Table IV.2.
should therefore observe fewer suits by these creditors because they would
sue primarily when they plan to enforce their judgments. I cannot test this
theory using my data, but I can test a related theory: If non-financial
creditors sue to induce a settlement prior to judgment, financial institutions
should be more likely to try to enforce any judgments that they obtain. 
In evaluating the threat value of a judgment, one must remember that
even a small creditor does not need to sue the consumer to record the
default in the consumer’s credit report. The assignment of the debt to a
collection agency serves the same purpose because these collection agents
report the default to the credit bureaus.  This suggests that the use of civil122
suits should be highly dependent on both the cost of suing and state
regulations that restrict the use of collection agents.
3.  Should Bankruptcy and Civil Filings Follow the Same Trend?
Consumers who struggle to pay their bills have four basic options:
repay in full, convince the creditor to accept partial payment, file for
bankruptcy, or work through informal bankruptcy. Creditors will choose
to sue some, but not all, consumers who do not pay and do not file for
bankruptcy. If the number of consumers who struggle to pay their bills
rises, and neither the fraction that choose bankruptcy nor the fraction that
is sued changes, both the number of consumers who file for bankruptcy
and the number of consumers who are sued should increase. Therefore, the
absence of an increase in the amount of civil litigation provides at least
some evidence supporting the claim that Americans are more likely to file
for bankruptcy than they were in the past.
This evidence is not, however, conclusive. There are at least two basic
reasons why the civil filing rate may have grown much more slowly than
the financial-distress rate. First, many civil filings have nothing to do with
a consumer’s inability or unwillingness to pay his debts, and thus the
effects of an increase in financial distress on the civil filing rate will be
muted. Second, the fraction of consumers in financial distress who default
and are sued by their creditors may have changed over time. 
Broad measures of civil litigation obviously include many cases that
have nothing to do with consumer financial distress. For example,
businesses will sue businesses. I do not know if this explanation plays an
important role in explaining the relative stability of the national civil
litigation rate analyzed in Part II because I do not know the composition
of this litigation. However, I do know that this explanation is unimportant
when analyzing filings in Virginia general district courts. Nearly all civil
filings in general district courts seek to collect debt from individuals.123
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124. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
125. See infra Table IV.6 and accompanying text.
126. See infra Table IV.8.
127. See infra Table IV.4.
128. For example, a well-publicized study of the role of medical expenses in consumer
bankruptcy classified individuals as “Major Medical Bankruptcies” if they had $1,000 in uncovered
medical expenses over two years. See David U. Himmelstein et al., MarketWatch: Illness and
Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 2005, at W5-63, -65,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.63v1.
129. See infra Table IV.9.
130. See Hynes, supra note 22, at 639–45. My prior article may have understated the
importance of increases in the cost of litigation. Consumer debt collection is, however, an
extremely low-margin business; therefore, even a small change in costs could have very significant
effects. Based on conversations with the clerk of the Richmond general district court, the real cost
of filing a complaint and serving process actually fell between 1995 and 2005. In July 1995, the
cost of filing suit and serving a complaint was $30 ($39.69 in 2006 dollars). In 2005, the cost of
filing suit and serving a complaint was $38 ($39.23 in 2006 dollars). However, the cost of seeking
a garnishment action rose substantially due to a change in the sheriff’s charge for serving process
that took effect in 2004. In 1995, a garnishment action cost an additional $30 ($39.69 in 2006
dollars), and in 2005 it cost $74 ($76.39 in 2006 dollars). Moreover, the cost of filing suit and
seeking garnishment was dramatically lower in 1991. In 1991, a creditor could file suit and seek
a garnishment order for just $20 total ($29.60 in 2006 dollars). In 2005, this amount was $112
($115.61 in 2006 dollars). Telephone Interview with Ms. Sandra Cox Blount, Clerk of Court,
Richmond Civil Gen. Dist. Court (Oct. 30, 2007); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Nov. 16,
2007). It is therefore possible that an increase in fees could have dampened the increase in
A consumer who finds himself sued in state court is not necessarily
unable or even unwilling to pay his debts; he may simply dispute the
validity of the claim asserted against him. Some evidence supports the
claim that many suits are unrelated to an inability or unwillingness to pay
debts generally. The civil filing rate is perhaps too stable; it does not tend
to rise substantially as unemployment or consumer debt levels increase.124
Most consumers are sued just once or twice in a given year,  most125
judgments are for less than $1,000,  and a large number of suits are126
brought by trade creditors—medical-service providers, furniture stores,
utility providers.  On the other hand, a $1,000 or even $500 bill may be127
sufficient to push many Americans into financial distress,  and the vast128
majority of judgments are apparently never paid.  In other words, the129
civil filing statistics raise precisely the same question that is raised by the
bankruptcy filing statistics—do these filings represent consumers who
can’t pay or simply won’t pay?
A civil lawsuit is just one of the tools that creditors use to collect debts,
and it is possible that legal or technological changes have caused creditors
to move away from the state courts. In a prior article, I considered changes
in federal law and Virginia state law that would explain a shift away from
the use of civil litigation to collect debts, and I concluded that these
changes were unlikely to explain much of the missing litigation.  I also130
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litigation. Perhaps other jurisdictions have substantially raised the cost of filing as well.
131. Hynes, supra note 22, at 646–47; see also Hunt, supra note 114, at 15–16 (describing the
advent of WATS lines, predictive dialing, and computer models that predict which collection
methods are most likely to achieve results with a particular debtor).
132. See Hynes, supra note 22, at 648.
133. See infra Table IV.4.
134. See infra Table IV.4.
135. The number of non-business bankruptcies in Virginia grew from 41,763 in 1997 to 44,621
in 2005. Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual U.S. Bankruptcy Filings by State 1995–1999,
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDi
splay.cfm&CONTENTID=35718 (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Filings by
State 1995–1999]; Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual U.S. Bankruptcy Filings by State 2000–2006,
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/
ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=46951 (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Bankruptcy
Filings by State 2000–2006]. However, Virginia’s population grew from 6,829,000 in 1997 to
7,567,000 in 2005. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: ESTIMATES &
PROJECTIONS—STATES, METROPOLITAN AREAS, CITIES, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/
population/estimates_and_projectionsstates_metropolitan_areas_cities/ (then follow “17 - Resident
Population—States: 1980 to 2005” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
136. See Hynes, supra note 22, at 648.
noted, however, that the debt-collection industry has undergone major
technological advances that could have made non-judicial collection
techniques less expensive relative to a lawsuit.  Unfortunately, I still lack131
the data necessary to test the importance of this explanation for the
divergence in the civil-litigation and non-business bankruptcy statistics.
The data collected in this Article do, however, allow for an assessment
of the importance of two other explanations that I raised in my earlier
article. First, an increase in the availability of credit may help explain a
simultaneous rise in bankruptcies and fall in civil litigation.  Greater132
access to credit may allow a consumer to avoid defaulting on unexpected
obligations such as medical bills and thereby avoid lawsuits. If the
consumer uses this credit to meet a large number of unexpected
obligations, however, he may find that his debt burden has grown too large
to repay and that it has grown sufficiently large to make bankruptcy more
attractive than simply refusing to pay. The data presented below offer
mixed support for this explanation. Trade creditors comprise a large
portion of the plaintiffs in state court.  The share of the civil filings133
brought by these trade creditors has not fallen appreciably in the last ten
years;  however, much of the increase in Virginia’s bankruptcy filing rate134
occurred prior to the years for which the district courts still retain records.
Virginia’s bankruptcy filing rate was actually higher in 1997 than it was
in 2005.  135
In my prior article, I also suggested that changes in credit markets
might explain the divergence between the civil filing rate and the
bankruptcy filing rate.  In particular, credit card companies may be less136
likely to sue than other creditors either because their size allows them to
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137. See id.
138. See infra notes 272–73 and accompanying text.
139. I was also able to construct a measure of the use of garnishment in Cook County, Illinois,
by using a database on Lexis. See Hynes, supra note 22, at 607.
140. These statistics are published in annual reports. See, e.g., COURT STATISTICS PROJECT,
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2005 (2006), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2005_files/State%20Court%20Caseload%20Statistics
%202005.pdf [hereinafter STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 2005].
141. See infra text following note 240.
use technology that makes other collection techniques more valuable or
because they fear that a large number of suits could damage their
reputation.  This Article finds that credit card companies comprise a137
surprisingly small share of the plaintiffs.  On the other hand, I cannot138
conclude that these creditors are less likely to sue because I do not know
the total number of defaults on credit card accounts or the total number of
defaults on other obligations.
Sections 1 and 2 above suggest that bankrupt debtors and civil
defendants may be drawn from very different populations, and the
divergence between civil filings and bankruptcy filings may indicate a
sharp divergence in the economic well-being of these two groups. The rise
in bankruptcy filings may indicate a rise in financial distress among the
middle class, while the stable (but high) rate of consumer debt collection
in state court may indicate that the amount of financial distress suffered by
the poor has not grown appreciably over time. The data are consistent with
this claim—civil litigation seems to be disproportionately concentrated in
disadvantaged areas. However, the data do not suggest that civil litigation
is exclusively confined to these areas, and further research is needed to
determine the financial characteristics of the consumers who are sued.
II.  THE EXTENT OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
This Article suggests that statistics capturing the amount of consumer
debt collection litigation can serve as an additional proxy for consumer
default and insolvency. Unfortunately, states do not publish statistics on
consumer debt collection litigation. In a prior article, I used garnishment
as a proxy for consumer debt collection litigation, but I could find only
one state, Virginia, that reported how often this remedy is used.139
However, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) publishes statistics
on the use of civil litigation generally,  and these statistics can be used140
to test whether the stability of the Virginia garnishment rate is likely to be
an anomaly. 
Part IV shows that the overwhelming majority of civil suits filed in
Virginia are consumer debt collection filings,  and the evidence suggests141
that consumer debt collection accounts for a very high percentage of the
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142. See infra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
143. See infra Table II.2; see also STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 2005, supra note 140,
at 116 tbl.3.
144. See infra Table II.3.
145. See Consumer Data, supra note 7, at 51 tbl.1.
146. See Credit Report Accuracy, supra note 7, at 303 tbl.1.
147. See Consumer Data, supra note 7, at 67 tbl.10. There are very few lawsuits in the sample
because credit-reporting agencies typically wait for a judgment. 
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
149. See Consumer Data, supra note 7, at 67.
150. Id. at 67 tbl.10.
151. Id.
152. Id.
civil filings of other states.  Consumer debt collection will not dominate142
the docket in every state, and the civil litigation statistics will not record
those consumers who default but are not sued. However, the civil filing
statistics provide geographic and temporal variation that is unavailable in
any other publicly available data set besides the bankruptcy statistics.
The NCSC’s statistics establish two clear facts. First, the civil filing
rate varies widely from state to state, and Virginia has one of the highest
rates in the country.  Second, the civil filing rate has remained143
dramatically more stable than the bankruptcy filing rate.  It is very144
unlikely that the rate of consumer debt collection litigation has risen as
quickly as the bankruptcy filing rate.
A.  Prior Literature on the Use of Civil Litigation to Collect
   Consumer Debts
There has been surprisingly little recent research on the use of civil
litigation to collect consumer debts. Perhaps the best existing data are
found in two Federal Reserve studies that examine consumer credit
reports. The first Federal Reserve article uses a 1999 sample of credit
reports and finds that 12.3% of the individuals had a “public record” in
their credit file.  The second article uses a 2003 sample and finds that145
12.2% of the individuals had a public record in their credit file.  These146
public records include bankruptcy filings (22.7% of the 1999 public
records), liens (34.1%), judgments (39.7%), and lawsuits (2.6%).  These147
are not yearly figures; bankruptcy may remain in the credit reports for ten
years, while judgments may remain for seven years or until their statute of
limitations expires.  About 37% of the consumers with public records in148
their file have more than one.  While the credit reports reveal a large149
number of judgments, very few (15.8%) of these judgments appear to have
been satisfied.  Of those judgments that have not been satisfied, the150
median amount outstanding is between $500 and $1,000.  Just 3.1% of151
the unpaid judgments are for more than $10,000.  The first article152
classifies the creditors who obtained the judgments: 17.7% medical, 4.5%
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153. Id. “Creditor” includes “large retailers, banking institutions, and finance companies.” Id.
“Other” includes “small retailers, law firms, individuals, [and] educational institutions.” See id.
154. The results do report how frequently individuals have more than one “public record” in
their file, but they do not identify judgments separately from other public records. See id. at 67.
155. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
156. See generally CAROL J. DEFRANCES & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL
JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: CONTRACT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES (1996), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ccilc.pdf (noting the number of contract disputes
disposed of by the state courts of general jurisdiction); CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: CIVIL JURY CASES AND
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES (1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
cjcavilc.pdf (studying juries in state general jurisdiction courts); FRANCIS W. LAURENT, THE
BUSINESS OF A TRIAL COURT (1959) (studying the proceedings of a trial court of general jurisdiction
during a hundred-year period from 1855 to 1954); WAYNE V. MCINTOSH, THE APPEAL OF CIVIL
LAW (1990) (using data from civil trial cases filed in St. Louis, Missouri, circuit court to test
theoretical predictions of socioeconomic change and litigation); MOLLY SELVIN & PATRICIA A.
EBENER, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE: A HISTORY OF CIVIL
DELAY IN LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT (1984), available at http://rand.org/pubs/reports/2007/
R3165.pdf (exploring delay in a court of general jurisdiction); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Federal
Product Liability Litigation Reform: Recent Developments and Statistics: Litigation Outcomes in
State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433 (1996) (using state
courts of general jurisidiction as part of their sample); Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V.
utility, 3.9% government, 5.7% collection agency, 25.4% creditor, and
42.9% other.153
The Federal Reserve results are largely consistent with the analysis in
Part I: a large number of civil judgments, a low rate of satisfaction, low
judgment values relative to the likely costs of filing for bankruptcy, and
a significant share of the judgments in favor of non-financial creditors.
However, the Federal Reserve’s studies leave important questions
unanswered. For example, we do not know how often multiple judgments
are entered against the same individual,  so we do not know how many154
individuals are sued. We also do not know how many judgment debtors
later file for bankruptcy. The studies find a large number of unpaid
judgments, but we don’t know whether the creditors are actively pursuing
these judgments. The studies find that most judgments have rather small
balances remaining, but we do not know the original amount. Perhaps
more importantly, these statistics do not tell us whether the defaulting
debtors who file for bankruptcy differ markedly from those who do not.
Finally, the statistics do not reveal how the judgments are distributed
across states or across time.
Though there are no readily accessible statistics on consumer debt
collection litigation, the NCSC publishes data on the total amount of civil
litigation in each state.  These statistics are not discussed in most of the155
prior empirical literature on civil litigation. Most of the books and
empirical articles examining civil litigation in state courts have little
relevance to consumer insolvency because they focus on courts of
“general jurisdiction.”  Despite the label, many of these courts lack156
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Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 267 (1976) (studying the civil load of two California trial courts between 1890 and 1970);
Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to Know About
Contract Litigation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 577, 592 (compiling and summarizing data on contract
litigation); Brian J. Ostrom, Shauna M. Strickland & Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Examining Trial
Trends in State Courts: 1976–2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 756 (2004) (“[W]e introduce
the results from a major new data collection initiative . . . designed to ascertain trial trends in state
general jurisdiction courts.”). 
157. See STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 2005, supra note 140, at 76 fig.C (listing the
minimum dollar amounts needed to have jurisdiction in state trial courts). A number of articles
focus on courts at the other end of the spectrum—small claims courts. For a good, but dated,
overview of this literature, see Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex
Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 219 (1975). For useful
works published more recently, see JOHN A. GOERDT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SMALL
CLAIMS AND TRAFFIC COURTS (1992); JOHN C. RUHNKA & STEVEN WELLER, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: A NATIONAL EXAMINATION (1978); Suzanne E. Elwell
& Christopher D. Carlson, The Iowa Small Claims Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. REV.
433 (1990); Thomas L. Eovaldi & Peter R. Meyers, The Pro Se Small Claims Court in Chicago:
Justice for the “Little Guy”?, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 947 (1978). Unfortunately, most of these works
focus on just one state and do not track changes in the use of these courts over time. One recent
exception is a series of articles published in the Boston Globe. See Michael Rezendes & Francie
Latour, No Mercy for Consumers; Firms’ Tactics Are One Mark of a System That Penalizes Those
Who Owe, BOSTON GLOBE, July 30, 2006, at A1; Beth Healy, Dignity Faces a Steamroller; Small-
Claims Proceedings Ignore Rights, Tilt to Collectors, BOSTON GLOBE, Jul. 31, 2006, at A1; Walter
V. Robinson & Michael Rezendes, Enforcers’ Might Goes Unchecked, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1,
2006, at A1; Walter V. Robinson & Beth Healy, Regulators, Policy Makers Seldom Intervene,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2006, at A1. As is obvious from the titles of the articles, this series
reiterates an old theme in the small-claims literature—small-claims courts are used by the powerful
to collect from the poor. See Small Claims Courts as Collections Agencies, 4 STAN. L. REV. 237
(1952) (criticizing how creditors use small-claims courts to collect from the poor). The Boston
Globe series provides important insight into consumer debt collection in Massachusetts courts, but
at times the series overstates its claims. For example, the series reports a “tidal wave of lawsuits,”
Robinson & Healy, supra, but the data presented in the prior day’s article tell a very different story.
They report an 11% increase in the number of small claims in Massachusetts “over the past
decade.” Healy, supra. Assuming that they are measuring the change in civil litigation from 1995
to 2005, this represents an increase in the rate of civil litigation (small claims per thousand
population) of about 6.5%, or just 0.6% a year. By contrast, the number of non-business
bankruptcies filed in Massachusetts per thousand population increased by 83% during this same
period. The population of Massachusetts was approximately 6,141,000 in 1995 and 6,399,000 in
2005. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 20 tbl.17. The total number of non-business
bankruptcies grew from 13,796 in 1995 to 26,308 in 2005. Bankruptcy Filings by State 1995–1999,
supra note 135; Bankruptcy Filings by State 2000–2006, supra note 135.
158. See STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 2005, supra note 140, at 76 fig.C.
jurisdiction to hear most consumer debt collection cases because they
cannot hear claims that seek less than a few thousand dollars.  In157
addition, most states provide their trial courts with overlapping
jurisdiction, and their courts of limited jurisdiction are authorized to hear
claims of up to $10,000 or more.  As a result, most unsecured consumer158
debts fit comfortably within the jurisdiction of the limited-jurisdiction
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159. As noted above, the credit reports suggest that just 3.1% of outstanding judgments are
greater than $10,000, though more of the initial judgments may have exceeded this threshold. See
supra note 152 and accompanying text.
160. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS, 2005, at 23 (Richard Y. Schauffler et al. eds., 2006), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2005_files/0-EWWhole%20Document_final_1.pdf
[hereinafter EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS 2005]. The thirteen states are Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas. Id. Some of these limited-jurisdiction
courts may hear family-law claims or other matters.
161. Robert A. Kagan, The Routinization of Debt Collection: An Essay on Social Change and
Conflict in the Courts, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 323, 331 (1984).
162. Id. at 332 tbl.2, 334 tbl.3.
163. Id. at 336 tbl.4 (showing an increase in the combined debt collection litigation rate from
18.7 per thousand population in 1965 to 24 per thousand in 1980).
164. I use 2004 as a basis for comparison because the 2005 and 2006 bankruptcy statistics
were likely affected by the large number of individuals who filed in anticipation of the recent
bankruptcy reforms. There were 284,517 non-business bankruptcies in 1984 and 1,563,145 in 2004.
Am. Bankr. Inst., supra note 2. The population of the United States increased from 235,825,000
in 1984 to 293,657,000 in 2004. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 7 tbl.2. 
165. See Kagan, supra note 161, at 355–57. He also argues that there has been a “legal
rationalization” of credit transactions as institutional lenders are more willing to absorb bad-debt
losses rather than litigate and consumers are more willing to file for bankruptcy to avoid collection
courts,  and the overwhelming majority of suits are filed in these courts159
when they are available. For example, more than 90% of civil filings in
Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, and Virginia are
made in courts of limited jurisdiction, and more than 70% of civil suits are
filed in courts of limited jurisdiction in at least thirteen other states.160
Thus, the exclusion of the courts of limited jurisdiction renders most prior
studies inapplicable to the questions of how much consumer debt
collection litigation exists and how it has changed over time. 
A few prior articles examine changes in the amount of civil litigation
more generally. In 1984, Robert Kagan claimed to find a decline in debt
collection litigation from the end of World War II until the early 1980s.161
However, most of the data he used to show a decline in debt collection
litigation were drawn from courts of general jurisdiction —the courts162
that lacked jurisdiction to hear most consumer debt collection cases. His
article does present some data from municipal and small claims courts in
California, but these data show an increase of approximately 28% in the
civil filing rate over the fifteen-year period from 1965 to 1980.  Further,163
the non-business bankruptcy filing rate rose more than 300% between
1984 and 2004,  suggesting that there have been radical changes in debt164
collection since the publication of his paper. One of the major explanations
he offered for the decline in litigation contrasts sharply with much of the
current bankruptcy scholarship. He argued that a major cause of the
decline in civil litigation is the increase in “systematic stabilization” that
has made consumers less vulnerable to financial shocks.  Many modern165
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efforts. Id. at 362–63. Finally, he argues that legal changes have raised the cost of litigation for
creditors. Id. at 364–65.
166. See, e.g, Warren, supra note 1, at 26–28.
167. Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 6, 7 tbl.1
(1986).
168. Brian J. Ostrom & Thomas B. Marvell, The Collapse in Contract Case Filings Since
1991, 17 JUST. SYS. J. 221, 222, 223 tbl.1 (1994).
169. See Am. Bankr. Inst., supra note 2.
170. See Ostrom & Marvell, supra note 168, at 225.
171. See Hynes, supra note 22, at 607.
172. Bankruptcy Filings by State 2000–2006, supra note 135.
173. Id.
174. For the number of civil filings in 1996 through 2005, see Virginia’s Judicial Sys., District
Court Caseload Statistics, http://www.courts.state.va.us/csi/#dccs (last visited Nov. 16, 2007). For
the number of civil filings in 2006, see SUPREME COURT OF VA., VIRGINIA 2006 STATE OF THE
JUDICIARY REPORT, A106 (Christopher M. Wade et al. eds., 2006), available at
bankruptcy scholars have argued that the recent rise in the bankruptcy
filing rate proves that consumers are more vulnerable to financial
shocks.  166
In 1986, Marc Galanter used data from the NCSC to note a lack of a
“litigation explosion” between 1978 to 1984,  and in 1994, Ostrom and167
Marvell used this same source to show a decline in civil filings from 1992
to 1994.  These papers support the finding of a stable rate of civil168
litigation, but Galanter’s paper is now more than two decades old. The
number of bankruptcy filings has doubled since Ostrom and Marvell
published their article,  and their conclusion is based on just three years169
of data. Ultimately, Ostrom and Marvell attribute the decline in filings to
the recession of the early 1990s.  However, if they had identified the170
actual cause of the stagnant civil filing rate, the amount of litigation should
have expanded during the economic prosperity of the late 1990s. As
shown below, it did not.
In a recent article, I found a similar stability or an actual decline in the
rate of garnishment in two jurisdictions—the Commonwealth of Virginia
and Cook County, Illinois.  Since the publication of that article, the171
Virginia courts and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts have
released data that reflect the change in civil litigation and bankruptcy since
the implementation of the latest bankruptcy reforms. The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 2005 went into effect in October 2005 and had an
immediate and dramatic effect on the number of bankruptcy filings. The
number of non-business bankruptcy filings in Virginia dropped by more
than 70%, from 44,621 in 2005  to just 12,901 in 2006.  172 173
One might expect these reforms to increase the amount of civil
litigation. To the extent that financially distressed consumers cannot file
for bankruptcy, they remain vulnerable to suit. Figure II.1 presents the
garnishment rate (per 5,000 residents) and the civil filing rate (per 1,000
residents) for Virginia general district courts between 1996 and 2006.174
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http://www.courts.state.va.us/reports/2006/state_of_the_judiciary_report.pdf. For the population
statistics used in the Figure, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 135. The U.S. Census Bureau
does not report the population in 2006. I assumed that the rate of population growth between 2005
and 2006 was the same as the rate of growth between 2004 and 2005.
175. Compare VIRGINIA’S JUDICIAL SYS., DISTRICT COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS REPORT
01/05–12/05, at 323, http://www.courts.state.va.us/csi/dbr1_2005.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2007)
(listing the total new civil cases in general court as 828,392 for 2005), with VIRGINIA’S JUDICIAL
SYS., DISTRICT COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS REPORT 01/06–12/06, at 323,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/csi/dbr1_2006.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) (listing the total new
civil cases in general court as 827,718 for 2006).
176. See supra note 130.
177. For data used in this Figure, see supra note 174.
178. See Hynes, supra note 22, at 607.
Figure II.1 is scaled to accentuate any change in the filing rates over time.
The amount of civil litigation actually declined in 2006.  We can account175
for this decline in a number of ways. First, this is just one year, and the
decline appears to be a continuation of a general (and gentle) downward
trend in civil litigation in Virginia. Second, the demand for bankruptcy in
2006 may have been artificially low because so many debtors rushed to
beat the filing deadline in 2005. Finally, the Virginia courts increased
filing fees from $26 in 2005 to $36 in 2006,  and these increased costs176
could have offset any effect from the change in the bankruptcy law. We
will have to wait to determine if the bankruptcy reforms had any
meaningful effect on civil litigation.
Figure II.1: Total Civil Filing Rate and Garnishment Rate in
Virginia177
My prior article focused on garnishment on the theory that this remedy
was most closely related to consumer debt collection.  Part IV of this178
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179. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Robinson & Healy, supra note 157.
181. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
182. E-mail from Shauna M. Strickland, Court Research Analyst, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts,
to Richard Y. Schauffler, Dir., Research Servs., Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts (Mar. 7, 2007) (on file
with author) (“Reviewing the 2004 CSP civil data that we published in Examining the Work of State
Courts, 2005, I found the following: in 6 unified courts, small claims cases top the civil
composition at 42% and contract cases come in second at 27%. . . . So, since contract is a prevalent
case type and debt collection is likely to be more common than other contract case types, it seems
that it is likely that a good portion of civil cases are debt collection cases.”).
183. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
184. For a summary of these counting differences, see STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS
2005, supra note 140, at 71 fig.B (listing the methods of counting civil cases in state appellate
courts); id. at 99 fig.H (listing the methods of counting civil cases in state trial courts).
185. See Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 461, 473 (2003), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/
programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1404_hartman.pdf.
Article suggests that, at least in Virginia, the overwhelming majority of all
civil filings seek to collect debt from consumers. This may not be true
elsewhere, but there are a number of indications that consumer debt
collection plays an important role in the civil docket of many states. First,
the credit-report data discussed above suggest that Americans have
millions of unpaid judgments entered against them.  Second, others have179
noted that debt collection plays an important or even dominant role in the
civil dockets of specific states.  Third, the vast majority of civil suits are180
filed in courts of limited jurisdiction when these courts are available,181
and these courts cannot hear claims of more than a few thousand dollars.
Finally, in a few of the states that lack courts of limited jurisdiction, small
claims account for as much as 42% of their civil filings and contract
claims account for another 27%.182
B.  The National Center for State Courts’ Data
The NCSC published data on the amount of civil litigation in both
general- and limited-jurisdiction courts from 1976 to 1981 and from 1984
to 2004.  The data are not complete—many states are missing data for183
some or all of their courts in some years. In addition, data problems limit
the comparability of civil litigation rates across states. For example, a few
states count subsequent actions, such as garnishment, in their totals while
most states do not, and a few states exclude small claims from their totals
while most do not.  Even if the states applied the same methods of184
counting civil filings, peculiar state laws would still make a cross-state
comparison of civil filings a poor measure of differences in consumer
insolvency and default. For example, Maryland landlord–tenant law
requires that the first notice of an overdue rent payment come from the
court instead of the landlord,  and more than half of Maryland civil185
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186. In 2005, Maryland district courts received 525,814 landlord–tenant filings and just
352,800 other civil filings. MGMT. ANALYSIS & RESEARCH, MD. JUDICIAL CTR., THE DISTRICT
COURT MARYLAND JUDICIARY ANNUAL STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2005, at 64 chart DC-4.2.13,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/annualreport/reports/2005/district_court_1.pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2007). 
187. See supra note 143.
188. See supra note 144.
189. See infra Part IV.B.1; Table IV.1 and accompanying text.
190. These statistics also suggest that we may want to revisit Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook’s finding that few bankrupt debtors have been subject to civil litigation. See AS WE
FORGIVE, supra note 14, at 305 (finding that only one-third of debtors had a lawsuit filed against
them prior to bankruptcy and only one in ten had been subject to garnishment or another effort to
enforce a judgment). They based this observation on a study of bankrupt debtors in California,
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas, id. at 18, and Table II.2 reveals that four of these
jurisdictions have below-average litigation rates. The NCSC does not publish complete statistics
for Tennessee. See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS 2005, supra note 160, at 23.
filings are landlord–tenant disputes.  To the extent that states do not186
change their laws or counting methods, comparisons of civil litigation
across time present fewer problems.
Even allowing for these difficulties, the NCSC data seem to
demonstrate two facts about civil litigation in the United States. First, the
rate of civil litigation varies dramatically across states, and Virginia has
one of the highest rates of litigation.  Second, the civil filing rate of most187
states has remained fairly stable since the mid-1970s.  There is little188
evidence of growth in the rate of consumer debt collection litigation that
would match the growth in the non-business bankruptcy filing rate. 
C.  Differences in Civil Filing Rates Across States
Table II.2 presents the civil filing rate (exclusive of domestic relations)
per 100,000 people for each state in 2004. Even allowing for substantial
differences in the method used to count filings, the extremely large
variance revealed by Table II.2 suggests that some states have
dramatically higher filing rates than others. Significantly, Virginia’s rate
is more than two and a half times that of the median state, and only part of
this difference is likely due to Virginia’s method of counting filings. Part
IV suggests that after adjusting the Virginia filing rate to remove
subsequent filings such as garnishment from the total, Virginia’s filing rate
would still be more than one filing each year for every ten Virginians.189
One must remember the fact that Virginia is an outlier when interpreting
the findings of Part IV.  190
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191. The civil filing statistics are taken from the NCSC. EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS 2005, supra note 160, at 23. Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Wyoming did not report civil
data to the NCSC in 2004. Table II.2 also excludes Oregon, Maine, and Tennessee because the
NCSC did not receive data for courts of limited jurisdiction from these states. Id. The bankruptcy
statistics are taken from the American Bankruptcy Institute. Bankruptcy Filings by State
2000–2006, supra note 135. Population statistics are taken from the Statistical Abstract of the
United States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 20 tbl.17. 
192. See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS 2005, supra note 160, at 22 (“Maryland
reports an unusually high number of landlord/tenant cases that largely originate from the city of
Baltimore. Virginia . . . counts every civil petition and subsequent action as a separate
filing . . . . The District of Columbia’s small resident population . . . fails to account for all of the
out-of-District residents from Virginia and Maryland who are often embroiled in civil litigation
there.”). One might argue, however, that these reasons are insufficient to exclude these states. The
Table II.2: Civil and Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings per 100,000
People in 2004191
Civil Bankruptcy Civil Bankruptcy
M aryland 17,647 519 Kentucky 5,236 666
District of Columbia 14,602 344 Nebraska 5,134 499
Virginia 13,376 525 Iowa 5,097 429
New Jersey 9,676 466 Arizona 4,949 520
Georgia 8,605 836 Rhode Island 4,888 378
New York 8,353 394 Arkansas 4,808 860
Indiana 7,607 860 M issouri 4,627 642
Kansas 7,433 584 Wisconsin 4,514 482
Delaware 7,350 402 Illinois 4,418 621
M ichigan 7,207 628 Alabama 4,391 914
Ohio 7,148 771 West Virginia 4,354 621
South Carolina 7,036 359 North Dakota 4,226 346
Louisiana 7,021 646 New Hampshire 4,164 343
South Dakota 6,892 350 Alaska 3,954 218
Colorado 6,841 587 New M exico 3,858 456
Connecticut 6,589 322 Washington 3,848 600
Nevada 6,319 690 Pennsylvania 3,411 468
North Carolina 6,247 416 Texas 3,250 397
Idaho 5,954 653 Vermont 3,177 259
Florida 5,863 476 California 2,888 329
M ontana 5,828 451 M innesota 2,627 240
Utah 5,576 825 Hawaii 2,127 323
M assachusetts 5,504 283
Table II.2 also reveals that the civil filing rate and the non-business
bankruptcy filing rate are only weakly correlated (0.12). The NCSC casts
some doubt on the litigation statistics for Maryland, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia.  If one excludes these jurisdictions, the correlation192
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landlord–tenant disputes of Baltimore may be unusually common, but they are actual civil filings.
This Article demonstrates that Virginia’s civil litigation docket is extremely active even after one
removes the subsequent filings. See infra Part IV.B.1. If it is true that the District of Columbia’s
civil litigation rate is overestimated due to the presence of residents of Virginia and Maryland, this
suggests that the litigation rates of these two states (the two most litigious) are underestimated.
193. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
between civil litigation and bankruptcy improves to 0.32. Perhaps we
should not expect a higher correlation between civil litigation and
bankruptcy. First, even if civil litigation serves as a proxy for the rate of
default, a large number of bankruptcy filings means that a large number
of defaulting consumers cannot be sued. Second, states employ different
methodologies when counting the number of civil filings.  Third, at least193
some civil litigation has nothing to do with consumer financial distress.194
Finally, creditors can rely more heavily on other collection methods if a
state makes its litigation process too expensive or ineffective.
D.  The Relative Stability in Civil Filing Rates over Time
Table II.3 presents the rate of change in the civil and bankruptcy filing
rates for every state for which the NCSC provides complete data in 1980,
1990, and 2002. In contrast to Table II.2, Table II.3 includes domestic-
relations cases. The primary lesson of Table II.3 is that the civil filing rate
has been markedly more stable than the non-business bankruptcy filing
rate. The median civil filing rate rose by 24% between 1980 and 2002, and
the average civil filing rate (weighted by population) rose by just 12%. In
contrast, the median bankruptcy filing rate in these states rose by 362%,
and the weighted average rose by 276%. Consumer debt collection
litigation comprises just a portion of all civil litigation, and any increase
in consumer debt collection may be muted by stability or declining rates
of other forms of litigation. However, it would be difficult to reconcile the
very different growth rates in civil litigation and bankruptcy without
assuming that consumer debt collection comprises an implausibly small
fraction of civil litigation. 
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195. The civil filing statistics are taken from the NCSC. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2003, at 20 (Brian J. Ostrom
et al. eds., 2004), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2003_Files/2003_Full_
Report.pdf; COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS, 1990, at 11 tbl.I.4 (1992); COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 1980, at 58–66 (1984). The bankruptcy statistics
are taken from the American Bankruptcy Institute Bankruptcy Filings by State 2000–2006, supra
note 135; Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual U.S. Bankruptcy Filings by State 1990–1994,
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=35717&TEM
PLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2007); Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual U.S.
Bankruptcy F i l ings by S ta te  1980–1984,  http: //www.abiworld.org/AM/
AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=35680
(last visited Nov. 16, 2007). Population statistics are taken from the Statistical Abstract of the
United States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 20 tbl.17.
196. Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin are excluded because the NCSC lacks data from these
Table II.3: Percent Change in Civil and Non-Business Bankruptcy
Filing Rates195
1980 to 2002 1990 to 2002 1980 to 2002 1990 to 2002
Civil Bankruptcy Civil Bankruptcy Civil Bankruptcy C ivil Bankruptcy
AK -3% 302% -1% 19% M A -7% 476% -14% 92%
AZ 12% 349% -11% 23% M N -8% 269% -10% 16%
CA -33% 148% -26% 23% M O 21% 356% 5% 126%
CO 29% 174% 26% -2% NH -30% 386% -45% 61%
CT 9% 468% 5% 113% NC 17% 272% -15% 152%
DE 46% 426% 10% 174% ND 83% 456% 31% 126%
DC -19% 398% -21% 174% OH 41% 206% 15% 94%
FL 69% 963% 25% 109% PA 46% 699% 14% 221%
HI -8% 508% -23% 395% SD 73% 481% 48% 111%
ID 24% 259% 14% 75% VT 46% 723% -2% 205%
IL -11% 201% -7% 106% VA 46% 287% -6% 92%
IA 4% 300% 5% 128% WA -9% 326% -4% 121%
KS 74% 246% 34% 63% WV 38% 657% 31% 205%
KY 38% 235% 18% 81% WI 21% 388% -19% 134%
M edian 24% 362% 8% 129%
Average, Weighted by Population 12% 276% -3% 80%
Table II.3 suggests that much of the increase in the civil filing rate
occurred prior to 1990. The average civil filing rate was approximately the
same in 2002 as it was in 1990. Virginia’s experience was particularly
dramatic. Figure II.4 presents the civil filing rate in Virginia from 1976 to
1981 and 1984 to 2002 as well as the median and weighted average of all
states for which I have data in each of those years. Nine states from Table
II.3 are excluded from Figure II.4 because the NCSC lacks data for these
states in some of the years.  Virginia’s civil filing rate roughly doubled196
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states for some years.
197. Unfortunately, I do not know the cause of the increase in the civil filing rate during the
1980s, and general district courts do not retain court records that are more than ten years old. It is
quite possible that consumer debt collection litigation increased significantly during this period.
198. For data used in this Figure, see supra note 183 and accompanying text.
199. EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS 2005, supra note 160, at 22.
200. See id. at 16 (explaining that the civil and domestic-relations cases are treated as separate
categories).
201. Id. at 22.
202. The U.S. population was approximately 266,278,000 in 1995 and 293,657,000 in 2004.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 7 tbl.2. 
between 1976 and 1990 but then declined slightly (about 8%) between
1990 and 2002.197
Figure II.4: Civil Filing Rates Reported by NCSC  198
In a recent publication, the NCSC presents a graph showing the
increase in civil litigation in the United States from 1995 to 2004.  This199
graph excludes domestic-relations cases.  The NCSC’s graph shows a200
15% increase in total civil filings between 1995 and 2004 and a 19%
increase in civil filings in courts of limited jurisdiction.  As a practical201
matter, there is not much difference between the NCSC’s results and those
of Table II.3 or Figure II.4. The U.S. population increased by 10.3%
during this period, so the NCSC’s analysis shows a 4.3% increase in the
total civil litigation rate and a 7.9% increase in the civil litigation rate in
courts of limited jurisdiction.  In contrast, the national bankruptcy filing202
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203. The U.S. population was approximately 226,546,000 in 1980 and 287,985,000 in 2002.
Id. Americans filed 287,570 non-business bankruptcy filings in 1980, 874,642 in 1995, 1,539,111
in 2002, and 1,563,145 in 2004. See Am. Bankr. Inst., supra note 2.
204. This Article starts with a single state to make the project manageable. Virginia makes its
court dockets available on the Internet in searchable form, greatly enhancing the ability to gather
data. See Virginia’s Judicial Sys., Virginia Courts, http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/
courts.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2007). Court data from 2000 are used to facilitate comparisons
to other variables.
205. Compare infra Table III.1 (listing civil filing rates for Virginia’s judicial districts for
2000), with COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORKS
OF STATE COURTS, 2001, at 18 (Brian J. Ostrom et. al. eds. 2001), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2001_Files/2001_Full_Report.pdf (listing civil
filings rates for all states for 2000).
206. See COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, supra note 205, at 18 (listing Virginia’s rate of civil
filing as 14,315 per 1,000). One might also suspect that Virginia’s high civil filing rate is due to an
aggressive use of forum selection clauses whereby creditors sue out-of-state consumers in other
states. However, my search of the Richmond docket found that just 3% of the defendants resided
outside of Virginia. See supra note 204.
207. See FedStats State Court Districts: Virginia, http://www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/statecourts/
rate increased by more than 62% during this same period.203
Table II.3 suggests that there is substantial variance in the change in
civil litigation across states. North Dakota’s rate increased by 83%
between 1980 and 2002, and a few states, such as California and New
Hampshire, experienced a decrease in civil litigation. Interestingly, the rate
of change in civil litigation is moderately correlated with the rate of
change in the bankruptcy filing rate (0.37) if one measures the change
from 1980 to 2002. This suggests that some of the factors that have caused
an increase in the non-business bankruptcy filing rate may have had an
effect on civil filing rates. However, if one measures the change from 1990
to 2002, the two measures are uncorrelated (-0.04).
III.  EXAMINING DIFFERENCES IN CIVIL LITIGATION WITHIN VIRGINIA 
The next two Parts focus on civil litigation within Virginia.  Table204
III.1 lists the civil filing rate in the general district court of each judicial
district in Virginia in 2000 and the percentage of all Virginia filings that
each judicial district received. Nearly every judicial district has a civil
filing rate that is well above that of most states.  However, some districts205
have civil filing rates that are dramatically higher than others. Table III.1
demonstrates that Virginia’s high filing rate is probably unrelated to its
proximity to the District of Columbia; the litigation rates in the suburbs of
northern Virginia (districts 17, 18, 19, and 31) are substantially lower than
the state average.  More importantly, by comparing the filing rates with206
demographic variables for each judicial district or county, we can gain
some insight on the likely characteristics of the defendants. Specifically,
civil litigation is disproportionately concentrated in areas with more
disadvantaged individuals.  Though this Article focuses on Virginia, this207
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sc51.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) (providing demographic and economic data by judicial
district in Virginia).
208. For the district court civil filing statistics used in the Table, see VIRGINIA’S JUDICIAL
S Y S . ,  D I S T R I C T  C O U R T  C A S E L O A D  S T A T I S T I C S  R E P O R T  0 1 / 0 0 – 1 2 / 0 0 ,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/csi/dbr1_2000.pdf. For the Virginia County population statistics used
to calculate the filing rates in the Table, see Univ. of Va., Geospatial and Statistical Data Center,
2000 County Files, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/ccdb/county2000.html (last visited
Nov. 16, 2007). For a list of the district that corresponds to each county, see SUPREME COURT OF
VA., supra note 174, at B4.
209. See MD. JUDICIARY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLAND JUDICIARY: STATISTICAL
Part verifies that this concentration of civil litigation in disadvantaged
areas occurs in other states as well.
Table III.1: Virginia Civil Litigation by District in 2000208
Judicial
District
Civil Filings
per 100,000
Percent
of Total
Judicial
District
Civil Filings
per 100,000
Percent
of Total
1 16,446 3.6% 16 10,221 3.1%
2 18,532 8.7% 17 5,308 1.2%
2A 9,092 0.5% 18 9,867 1.4%
3 17,832 2.0% 19 4,590 5.0%
4 36,089 9.3% 20 4,415 1.1%
5 14,712 2.6% 21 14,754 1.6%
6 11,276 1.4% 22 13,236 1.7%
7 23,990 4.8% 23 16,923 3.8%
8 20,934 3.4% 24 12,259 3.1%
9 8,614 2.1% 25 8,759 2.0%
10 11,651 2.0% 26 12,716 4.1%
11 15,061 1.8% 27 7,876 2.2%
12 10,847 3.3% 28 7,978 0.9%
13 48,861 10.6% 29 7,838 1.0%
14 12,812 3.7% 30 4,723 0.5%
15 10,863 4.6% 31 8,432 3.0%
 
All Virginia judicial districts have active civil litigation dockets, but
some dockets are much more active than others. For example, Hampton
(district 8), Newport News (district 7), and Norfolk (district 4) all had
litigation rates in excess of 20,000 per 100,000 people, while the
neighboring 9th district received less than 9,000 civil filings in its general
district courts per 100,000 people. Other jurisdictions exhibit similar
disparities in their filing rates. For example, the general district court in the
city of Baltimore receives 24,377 landlord–tenant filings and 6,337
contract and tort (claims of less than $25,000) filings per 100,000 people
while the corresponding rates for the general district court in Montgomery
County are just 4,212 and 2,835 filing per 100,000 people.209
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ABSTRACT 1999–2000, at 22 tbl.DC-4, available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/
annual report/reports/2000/annualstats.pdf (listing total filings for each district and county); Univ.
of Va., supra note 208 (listing population statistics for each Maryland county).
210. In Virginia, cities are not subdivisions of counties but legally separate entities.
211. One could almost certainly test other states as well, but I have not done so.
212. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.
213. Ca. Courts, Self-Help Center: Small Claims Basics, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
selfhelp/smallclaims/scbasics.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
214. Ca. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, The Small Claims Court, A Guide to Its Practical Use:
Glossary of Terms, http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/small_claims/glossary.shtml (last visited
Nov. 16, 2007).
215. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4, cl. a1.
216. FLA. STAT. § 222.11 (2007) (exempting from garnishment “[a]ll of the disposable
earnings of a head of family whose disposable earnings are less than or equal to $500 a week”).
217. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 17, at 14–21, 325–26; STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 16, at
42–45.
218. See AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 14, at 91; FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at 53.
219. See infra Table III.2.
By comparing the filing rates in the cities and counties  within a state210
to demographic variables for those locations, we can gain some insight
into the likely characteristics of the defendants. Table III.2 sets forth the
variables, their meanings, and the summary statistics. This Part considers
four states: Virginia, Maryland, California, and Florida. I chose these
states because they have very different civil filing rates; their court
statistics make it easy to identify a class of filings that are likely to be
consumer debt collection; and the data identify where in the state these
suits were filed.  Both Maryland and Virginia have unusually high civil211
filing rates, though most of Maryland’s high civil filing rate appears to be
due to an unusual aspect of its landlord–tenant law.  California and212
Florida have much lower civil filing rates. California appears to have
consciously decided to discourage the use of state courts to enforce
contracts against consumers. Each year a plaintiff may file just two claims
of more than $2,500 in small-claims court, and the filing fee for a claim
of less than $1,500 increases from $30 to $100 if the plaintiff has filed
more than twelve claims that year.  Debt-collection agencies and other213
assignees are barred from California small-claims courts altogether.214
Florida sharply limits the availability of creditor remedies. Florida allows
the consumer to exempt all of his home equity regardless of the value of
the home,  and Florida exempts all of a head of household’s wages from215
garnishment if certain conditions are met.216
In addition to the demographic variables that Caplovitz; Stanley and
Girth;  and Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook suggest,  I include217 218
variables capturing population density, crime rate, and a measure of the
importance of the retail and banking sector.  For Virginia I also include219
the number of physicians per 1,000 population. Scholars have argued that
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220. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: A LITERATURE REVIEW 12
(2000), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/24xx/doc2421/Bankruptcy.pdf.
221. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
222. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 220, at 21–23. Compare More Financial Distress,
supra note 18, at 247 (“[O]ur data are more consistent with a rise in stigma than the oft-asserted
decline.”), with Jeffrey Davis, Fixing Florida’s Execution Lien Law Part Two: Florida’s New
Judgment Lien on Personal Property, 54 FLA. L.REV. 119, 122 (2002) (“However, in today’s world
the stigma of filing bankruptcy is largely gone.”).
223. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 220, at 21–22.
224. See F. H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187,
201–02, 205 (1998) (suggesting that bankruptcy filing rates may depend on the strength of certain
social norms).
225. Id. at 201–02.
consumer bankruptcy increases as the degree of urbanization increases,220
and I include population density to test whether this effect extends to civil
litigation. The concentration of doctors and retail sales per capita are
included because Virginia places few limits on the plaintiff’s choice of
venue.221
One of the most heated debates in the consumer bankruptcy literature
is whether a decline in stigma has caused the increase in the bankruptcy
filing rate.  If this stigma applies to defaults generally instead of just222
bankruptcy, it could affect the rate of civil litigation as well.
Unfortunately, however, no one has developed a universally accepted
proxy for stigma.  One approach is to use a variable such as divorce rate223
that arguably increases as social stigma declines.  These variables do not,224
however, isolate the effects of stigma because they either directly affect
financial distress (divorce strains the family finances and increases the cost
of living)  or are affected by other variables that potentially increase225
financial distress. On the other hand, omitting any control for stigma could
arguably bias the results. I therefore include the crime rate in the analysis
presented below. The crime rate turns out to be a very strong predictor of
the civil filing rate, but there are a number of potential explanations for its
significance. First, it may indicate a greater default rate due to lessened
stigma. Second, it may reflect some measure of poverty not captured by
other control variables. Third, it may reflect some measure of economies
of scale at the courthouse if states add extra court capacity where the crime
rate is highest. 
40
Florida Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss1/1
2008] CONSUM ER DEBT CO LLECTION IN STATE CO URTS 41
226. For the sources of the civil litigation data, see infra notes 227–32. The number of doctors
is taken from the Virginia Board of Medicine, Practitioner Information Website,
http://www.Vahealthprovider.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2007). For all other data, see Univ. of Va.,
Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/ccdb/ (last
visited Nov. 16, 2007). In calculating the summary statistics, I weighted each county in accordance
with its population in 2000.
227. VIRGINIA’S JUDICIAL SYS., supra note 208, at 323.
228. Id.
229. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CA., 2001 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD
TRENDS 1990–1991 THROUGH 1999–2000 (2001), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
reference/documents/csr2001.pdf.
230. FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADM’R, 2000–01 STATISTICAL REFERENCE GUIDE,
available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/stats/bin/reference_guide/2000_01cntycivil.pdf.
231. MD. JUDICIARY, supra note 209.
232. Id.
Table III.2: Variables  and Definitions226
Variable Definition
VA 
M ean
(Std Dev.)
CA 
M ean
(Std Dev.)
FL 
M ean
(Std Dev.)
M D 
M ean
 (Std Dev.)
VAC Total civil filing in general district
court (less than $15,000) per
100,000 people in 2000227
12,840
(11,118)
VAG Garnishments per 100,000 people
in 2000228
2,493
(2,798)
CAC Civil filings seeking less than
$25,000 (limited civil filings and
small claims) per 100,000 people
in 2000229
2,370
(536)
FLC “Small Claims” (less than $5,000)
plus “Civil” ($5,001 to $15,000)
plus evictions per 100,000 people
in 2000230
3,754
(1,450)
M DCT Contract and Tort filings (less than
$25,000) per 100,000 people in
2000231
3,754
(1,450)
M DLT Landlord–tenant filings per
100,000 people in 2000232
9,927
(7,712)
HS Percent of population with high
school degree or higher in 1990
75.9
(12.3)
76.0
(6.7)
74.5
(6.3)
79.1
(9.3)
College Percent of population with
bachelor’s degree or higher in 1990
24.8
(13.9)
23.0
(6.3)
18.4
(5.0)
25.8
(12.7)
Income M edian family income in 1997 45,090
(14,811)
40,993
(7,973)
34,037
(4,184)
48,409
(11,933)
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Young Percent of population between the
ages of 18 and 44 in 2000
41.2
(5.3)
41.6
(2.9)
36.9
(5.5)
39.9
(2.2)
Poverty Percent of population in poverty in
1997
11.7
(6.3)
16.0
(5.1)
14.4
(3.9)
9.50
(6.0)
Home Percent of homes or apartments that
were owner-occupied in 2000
68.5
(12.1)
57.0
(8.1)
69.6
(8.2)
67.9
(8.8)
Popdens Population per square mile in 2000 1,532
(1,832)
1,727
(2,548)
848
(742)
1,940
(2,402)
White Percent of population listed as white
in 2000
72.3
(15.2)
59.5
(10.7)
78
(8.8)
64.0
(23.6)
Crime Crime rate (FBI) in 1999 3,135
(1,711)
6,555
(1,347)
6,205
(1,805)
5,612
(2,500)
Unem p Unem ployment rate in 2000 2.3
(1.5)
5.1
(1.6)
3.7
(1.3)
3.99
(2.11)
Retail Retail sales per capita in 1997 9,308
(4,897)
8,167
(1,256)
10,322
(2,055)
9,151
(2,164)
M ed Physicians per 100,000 people 307.9
(349.3)
Table III.3 presents the correlations (weighted by county population)
between the log of the civil filing measures in Virginia and the various
explanatory variables. The two measures of litigation in Virginia are
highly correlated. Both are positively correlated with poverty,
unemployment, and the percentage of the population between the ages of
eighteen and forty-four. Both measures are negatively correlated with
median income, education, homeownership, and the percentage of the
population that is white. Note that income represents the median income
in the city or county of the district and not the defendant’s income.
Therefore, I cannot attribute this result to the idea that defendants are more
likely to be sued when they suffer a temporary shock to their income.
These results suggest that civil litigation is disproportionately concentrated
in areas with more disadvantaged individuals. The litigation measures are
also very strongly correlated with the log of the crime rate. As noted
before, it is unclear whether this represents the importance of stigma or
various other social problems. The measures are correlated with retail
sales and the concentration of physicians, suggesting that these creditors
may play a significant role in civil litigation. I confirm this suggestion in
Part IV below. Finally, Table III.3 confirms that these results are not
unique to Virginia. 
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233. I calculated these correlations using the data in Table III.2.
234. The regressions weight each county by its population in 2000. The results do not change
markedly if Richmond is excluded from the sample.
235. See infra Part IV.
Table III.3: Pairwise Correlations233
Ln(VAC) Ln(VAG) Ln(CAC) Ln(FLC) Ln(M DCT) Ln(M DLT)
Ln(VAG) 0.95***
Ln(M DLT) 0.84***
HS -0.11 -0.13 -0.47*** -0.15 -0.62** -0.36*
College -0.26*** -0.27*** -0.34** 0.20* -0.36* -0.16
Ln(Income) -0.48*** -0.47*** -0.43*** 0.02 -0.75*** -0.47**
Young 0.24*** 0.18* 0.09 0.62*** 0.19 0.46**
Poverty 0.57*** 0.53*** 0.55*** 0.34*** 0.72*** 0.51**
Home -0.60*** -0.52*** -0.38*** -0.67*** -0.82*** -0.80***
Ln(Popdens) 0.37*** 0.31*** 0.33** 0.42*** 0.52*** 0.74***
White -0.55*** -0.54*** -0.46*** -0.72*** -0.68*** -0.73***
Ln(Crime) 0.76*** 0.73*** 0.67*** 0.61*** 0.81*** 0.87***
Unemp 0.26*** 0.21** 0.09 0.32** 0.71*** 0.47**
Ln(Retail) 0.47*** 0.56*** -0.27** 0.31** -0.31 -0.27
Ln(M ed) 0.48*** 0.44**
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
Table III.4 presents a few regressions that try to determine which
variables are most significant and the magnitude of any effects these
variables have on civil litigation.  Because I have so few observations,234
only some of the variables are included. The various measures of
education, poverty, and unemployment are excluded because they are all
highly correlated with median income. Of the variables that are included,
the most robustly significant variables are median income, the percentage
of the population that is white, and the crime rate. Models with just these
three variables explain almost 70% of the variance in Virginia’s filing rate.
Table III.5 confirms that the results are not unique to Virginia. In
particular, the crime rate is strongly significant in predicting the civil filing
rate in the counties of each state. Seven of the eight coefficients on median
income and the percentage of the population that is white have the
“correct” sign, but only three are statistically significant. Even so, this
simple model explains at least half of the variation in civil filing in each
regression. On balance, these results suggest that civil defendants are
likely to be disproportionately (but not exclusively) drawn from
disadvantaged sectors of our society and may therefore be relevantly
different from the middle-class bankrupt debtors. Part IV provides further
evidence for this possibility in the form of relatively low homeownership
rates among civil defendants.235
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236. I calculated these regressions using the data on Virginia in Tables III.2 & III.3.
237. I calculated these regressions using the data on other states in Tables III.2 & III.3.
Table III.4: Regressions—Civil Filing Rate, Virginia236
Ln(VAC) Ln(VAC) Ln(VAC)
White
-0.009
(.013)**
-0.014
(.000)***
-0.010
(.001)***
Young
0.005
(0.703)
0.013
(.324)
Ln(Income)
-1.05
(.000)***
-1.52
(.000)***
-0.708
(.000)***
Home
0.010
(.279)
0.012
(.222)
Ln(Popdens)
0.072
(.221)
0.140
(.222)
Ln(Retail)
0.041
(.739)
0.267
(.036)**
Ln(M ed)
0.140
(.034)**
0.180
(.001)***
Ln(Crime)
0.606
(.000)***
0.795
(.000)***
Constant
13.83
(.000)***
18.66
(.000)***
11.12
(.000)***
Obs 125 125 126
R-sq 0.72 0.64 0.69
p values in parentheses
Table III.5: Regressions—Civil Filing Rate, Other States237
Ln(CAC) Ln(M DCT) Ln(M DLT) Ln(FLC)
White
-0.002
(.539)
-0.003
(.278)
-0.005
(.502)
-0.026
(.000)***
Ln(Income)
-0.329
(.045)**
-0.641
(.001)***
-0.041
(.926)
0.022
(.938)
Ln(Crime)
0.640
(.000)***
0.378
(.027)**
1.62
(.001)***
0.315
(.037)**
Constant
5.726
(.039)**
12.0
(.027)**
-4.26
(.567)
6.82
(.037)**
Obs 54 24 24 67
R-sq 0.50 0.80 0.76 0.56
p values in parentheses
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238. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
239. See infra Part IV.B.2.
240. See infra Part IV.B.3.
241. See infra Part IV.C.1.
242. See infra Part IV.C.2.
243. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
244. See infra Part IV.C.3.
245. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
246. See infra Part IV.C.4.
IV.  LESSONS FROM THE INDIVIDUAL COURT FILINGS
Part I suggests that a preoccupation with bankruptcy will cause us to
overlook a substantial number of defaulting and insolvent consumers and
that some of these defaulting consumers can be found in state court. Parts
II and III present civil litigation statistics, but these Parts do not
demonstrate that the civil filings have anything to do with consumer debt
collection. That is the task of this Part. This Part’s first goal is to estimate
how many Virginians default on legally binding obligations without filing
for bankruptcy. The aggregate civil filing statistics certainly overstate the
number of Virginians who are sued. First, Virginia includes subsequent
filings such as garnishment, in its total,  and thus the number of238
complaints is less than the number of filings. Second, some of the filings
will name institutions as defendants.  Third, a few defendants will be239
named in multiple suits.  Unfortunately, however, these explanations240
account for fewer of Virginia’s civil filings than one would like. Consumer
debt collection litigation appears to be extremely pervasive.
My examination of individual filings also allows me to confirm some
of the predictions of Part I. Most of the judgments are for relatively small
amounts, and yet very few judgments are paid in full.  Very few241
consumers file for bankruptcy once they are sued, and the percentage does
not change markedly if I focus on those consumers who still have not paid
a judgment after five years.  These debtors do not obtain a “fresh start,”242
and their creditors could pursue the judgments for a potentially unlimited
period.  However, the vast majority of court records show no collection243
activity beyond the first two years after the judgment.  This suggests that244
many debtors obtain an informal discharge without filing for bankruptcy;
their creditors appear to abandon collection efforts. Some creditors appear
more aggressive than others. Consistent with the analysis in Part I,
financial creditors are twice as likely to attempt to enforce their judgment
as are other creditors.  Finally, I find further evidence that civil245
defendants are likely to be substantially different than bankrupt debtors.
While prior research suggests that bankrupt debtors resemble the middle
class and have similar rates of homeownership, a search of the paper
records from Richmond, Virginia suggests that civil defendants have a
lower rate of homeownership than bankrupt debtors and the general
population.246
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247. See Virginia’s Judicial Sys., Case Information, http://www.courts.state.va.us/caseinfo/
home.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) (providing links to the searchable automated information
system for the Virginia courts).
248. The samples were created in three steps. First, I estimated the total number of complaints
in each county. In 2001 and 2005 this was done by determining the largest case number in each
county. For a description of the case-numbering system employed, see infra notes 257–58 and
accompanying text. Second, I randomly allocated the cases to each county based on the number of
complaints received. A few courts did not follow the case-numbering system in 1997, so I weighted
each county by the total number of civil filings in that year. Third, I randomly selected case
numbers within each county. Fourth, I collected the initial complaint and all subsequent filings
corresponding to that complaint.
249. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.55 (2007). 
250. See Virginia’s Judicial Sys., Internet Privacy Policy and an Internet Privacy Statement,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/sitemap/privacypolicy.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2007). 
251. The Norfolk general district court also kindly provided copies of court records.
Unfortunately, I did not fully understand the court’s case-numbering system at the time, and
therefore I did not pull a fully random sample.
A.  Sources of Data
This Part supplements the aggregate data with individual filings from
general district courts in Virginia. The Virginia courts post electronic
records of civil filings on the Internet,  and I collected random samples247 248
from 1997, 2001, and 2005. I did not gather records prior to 1997 because
courts can (and do) destroy records that are more than ten years old.249
Although the electronic records allow me to construct a random sample of
civil filings in Virginia, they are incomplete. The electronic records omit
any documentation attached to the initial complaint, and the courts remove
personal identification information, such as the defendant’s address, from
the electronic records.  Therefore, this Article also draws a sample of250
paper records from the Richmond general district court.251
B.  Each Year Hundreds of Thousands of Virginia Consumers
           Are Sued             
There are obviously more civil filings in Virginia than there are
Virginians who are sued. Some filings are efforts to collect previously
entered judgments, some filings seek to collect money from businesses,
and a few Virginians are sued many times. Even accounting for these
factors, however, it is clear that each year hundreds of thousands of
Virginians are sued for defaulting on consumer debts.
1.  Accounting for Subsequent Actions
Consider first the fact that Virginia includes subsequent actions, such
as garnishments and interrogatories, in its total number of civil filings
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252. See STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 2005, supra note 140, at 71 fig.B.
253. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-77 (2007) (providing general district courts with exclusive
jurisdiction over claims of less than $4,500 and concurrent jurisdiction over claims between $4,500
and $15,000). For an overview of the Virginia Court System, see Virginia’s Judicial Sys., Virginia
Courts in Brief, http://www.courts.state.va.us/cib/cib.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
254. See Virginia’s Judicial Sys., Circuit Court Caseload Statistics,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/csi/home.html#circuit (last visited Nov. 16, 2007). This figure does
not include appeals from general district courts and J&DR courts, reinstatements, garnishments,
divorce suits, or other equity suits.
255. The number of garnishments may actually stand for the total number of subsequent
proceedings. According to the data published on the court’s webpage, the total number of civil
filings equals the number of warrants in debt and unlawful-detainer actions plus the number of
motions for judgment and the number of garnishments. See, e.g., VIRGINIA’S JUDICIAL SYS.,
D I S T R I C T  CO U R T  CA S E LO A D  ST A T I S T I C S  RE P O R T  01/06–12/06,  at  323 ,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/csi/dbr1_2006.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2007). This cannot be right
because it implies that there were no other complaints (e.g., detinue) and no other subsequent
actions (e.g., interrogatories). An analyst at the Virginia courts confirmed that detinue is included
with warrant in debt and unlawful detainer. This analyst was unsure if interrogatories and other
subsequent filings were included with garnishments. E-mail from Chris Wade, Virginia courts, to
author (Oct. 31, 2007) (on file with author). To the extent that they are included, Table IV.1
understates the number of complaints in Virginia. 
256. See infra Table IV.11.
257. For example, the first filing that a general district court in a particular county receives in
2007 would be numbered “GV07000001-00.” Any subsequent actions (such as garnishments)
related to that complaint would be given the same initial number but would have a different suffix.
The first garnishment would be numbered “GV07000001-01”; the second would be numbered
“GV07000001-02.” The second complaint received by that county court would be numbered
“GV07000002-00.”
while most other states count only initial complaints.  In Virginia, a252
plaintiff may file a civil suit in either circuit court (claims greater than
$4,500) or general district court (claims less than $15,000).  The first253
column of Table IV.1 reports the number of complaints received by
Virginia circuit courts, exclusive of appeals, from general district and
family-law courts and exclusive of other family-law claims.  General254
district courts do not report the number of complaints that they receive,
and general district courts receive the overwhelming majority of filings.
General district courts do, however, report the number of garnishments
separately from all other filings.  Table IV.11 suggests that garnishments255
account for about 80% of all filings made after the initial complaint.256
Therefore, one can roughly estimate the number of civil complaints in
general district court by subtracting 1.25 times the number of
garnishments from the total number of filings. The fourth column of Table
IV.1 provides this estimate.
I provide an alternative estimate of the number of complaints that is
based on Virginia’s case-numbering system. Virginia courts assign each
new complaint a case number that identifies the year in which the
complaint was filed and the order in which the complaint was received.257
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258. My searches suggest that courts rarely skip case numbers. For example, in 2001 only one
of three hundred case numbers that I searched yielded no records. An additional four case numbers
yielded no complaint. However, there was a subsequent garnishment that corresponded to each of
these case numbers, and the plaintiff in each case was the state of Virginia. There were, however,
exceptions. In 1997, two counties, Mathews and Middlesex, skipped a large amount of case
numbers. Because these counties typically receive very few filings, I simply excluded them from
the totals listed in Table IV.1.
259. For data used in this Table, see supra notes 254–58 and accompanying text.
260. In 2001, Virginia had a population of approximately 7,191,941. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
supra note 2, at 20 tbl.17. 
261. See supra Table II.2.
262. This problem is not unique to civil litigation. Bankruptcy scholars argue that a significant
number of bankruptcies that are categorized as “non-business” in the official statistics are in fact
business bankruptcies. See Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth Warren, The Myth of the Disappearing
To the extent that courts do not skip case numbers,  the highest case258
number should equal the number of complaints in that court. The sum of
the highest case number in each city or county is given in the last column
of Table IV.1. Though not identical, the third and fourth columns exhibit
similar scale and a similar downward trend.
Table IV.1: Number of Complaints in Virginia259
CIRCUIT
COURTS
GENERAL DISTRICT COURTS
Virginia Court’s Reports This Study
Civil Filings in
Circuit Court
Total
Civil
Filings Garnishments
Total Filings Less
Estimated
Subsequent Filings
Estimated
Complaints
1997 41,825 974,615 174,048 757,055 747,631
2001 41,860 944,283 179,932 712,188 719,601
2005 40,894 888,940 175,583 669,461 672,001
Regardless of the estimation method, two facts emerge from Table
IV.1. First, the overwhelming majority of complaints are filed in general
district court, and so the rest of this Part will focus solely on general
district courts. Second, Virginia courts receive a staggering number of
complaints. In 2001, Virginia courts received around 750,000 civil
complaints, or approximately 10,400 complaints per hundred thousand
people.  This filing rate is much higher than that of nearly every other260
state.  More importantly, Virginia’s civil filing rate represents more than261
one complaint for every ten Virginians every year. 
2.  Consumer Debt Collection Dominates the Civil Docket
Table IV.2 demonstrates that nearly all general district court filings
seek a remedy from an individual. Some of these cases could be business
disputes; not all businesses operate in corporate form, and many
entrepreneurs guarantee the debts of their corporations.  However, there262
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Business Bankruptcy, 93 CAL. L. REV. 743, 747–48, 793 (2005).
263. For data used in this Table, see supra notes 247–48.
264. For data used in this Table, see supra notes 247–48.
is little reason to believe that these business debts comprise a large portion
of the courts’ dockets. Less than 1% of the claims listed both an individual
and the name of a business, and less than 3% of the claims listed an
individual doing business under a trade name. In addition, the nature of the
complaints does not indicate a large portion of business debts.
Table IV.2: Defendant Type263
1997 2001 2005
Claims listing
business only 2.2% (9 filings) 2.2% (13 filings) 3.7% (22 filings)
Claims listing
individual with
d/b/a name 0.5% (2 filings) 2.0% (12 filings) 0.5% (3 filings)
Claims listing
business and
individual 1.0% (4 filings) 0.8% (5 filings) 0.5% (3 filings)
Claims listing
single individual 86.1% (346 filings) 82.5% (495 filings) 82.5% (495 filings)
Claims listing
two or more
individuals 10.2% (41 filings) 12.5% (29 filings) 12.3% (77 filings)
Total filings 402 600 600
Because the electronic records do not contain any factual allegations,
I cannot determine the actual nature of each claim. I can, however, gain
some insight into the nature of the claim by looking at the form of
complaint the plaintiff chose. Table IV.3 presents the rate at which each
form appears in my sample.
Table IV.3: Percent of Claims by Type (Number of Filings)264
1997 2001 2005
Debt 59.7% (240) 63.3% (380) 61.8% (371)
Unlawful Detainer 21.4% (86) 20.7% (124) 24.3% (146)
M otion for Judgment 5.2% (21) 3.2% (19) 3.8% (23)
Detinue 3.7% (15) 3.8% (23) 3.7% (22)
Other 10.0% (40) 9.0% (54) 6.3% (38)
A warrant in debt seeks the payment of money, and these actions
account for roughly 60% of the civil filings in Virginia. Warrants in
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265. When speaking of consumer debt collection, most people probably envision the definition
used in the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2000) (defining “debt”
as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in
which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been
reduced to judgment”). Some of the paper records of filings brought by the government did not seek
any money at all but rather suspended licenses or imposed other punishment. 
266. For data used in this Table, see supra notes 247–48.
unlawful detainer, which typically relate to landlord–tenant disputes,
account for another 20% of the filings. A motion for judgment is an
extremely general form, and the plaintiff may use this form to ask for
almost any type of relief. A warrant in detinue seeks the return of specific
property, such as a couch, that has been rented or sold subject to a security
interest. There are relatively few motions for judgment and warrants in
detinue. Finally, there are a significant number of “other” claims—almost
10% of the total. These “others” include subsequent actions, such as a
garnishment, for which I could find no corresponding complaint. The
government brought nearly all of these “other” claims, and most were
probably not consumer debt collection claims.  265
A warrant in debt could be used by tort plaintiffs and so might not be
considered consumer debt collection. However, tort suits probably do not
account for a large share of the civil filings. Although the electronic
records do not contain the factual allegations, the records do list the name
of the plaintiff. Table IV.4 classifies the plaintiffs in the electronic records
into broad categories.
Table IV.4 Type of Plaintiff—Percentage (Number of Claims)266
Electronic Records— Statewide Richmond
1997 2001 2005 2001
Housing (includes
individuals filing
unlawful detainer)
23.4% (94) 21.7% (130) 26.5% (159) 25.7% (3)
M edical 18.7% (75) 22.2% (133) 22.5% (135) 16.0% (49)
Finance
  credit card
  other
16.2% (65) 16.3% (98) 18.2 % (109) 35.2% (108)
  (87)
  (21)  
Business-Other 16.4% (66) 14.2% (85) 12.2% (73) 9.1% (28)
Government 19.9% (80) 17.3% (104) 12.5% (75) 10.4% (32)
Individual (not unlawful
detainer)
   Tort
5.2% (21) 6.5% (39) 7.0% (42) 3.3% (10)
  (7)
Lawyer 0.7% (3) 1.0% (6) 1.2% (7) 0
Unknown 0 0.8% (5) 0 0.3% (1)
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267. See Consumer Data, supra note 7, at 67 tbl.10.
268. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An
Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 536–37
(2006) (arguing that these criticisms are largely misplaced).
269. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
270. I drew 306 records from Richmond. Other creditors seemed to dominate the docket in
other counties. For example, the University of Virginia’s medical center accounted for more than
one-third of the civil filings in a sample taken at the Albemarle County courthouse.
271. See supra Table III.1.
272. Frontline, Secret History of the Credit Card, Market Share of Top Ten Credit Card
Issuers, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/more/marketshare.html (last
visited Nov. 16, 2007). For a list of the top ten credit card issuers in 2005, see Ins. Info. Inst.,
Top Ten Credit Card Issuers by Outstandings, 2005–2006, http://www.iii.org/financial2/
Although Table IV.4’s categories are broad, even this level of
generality provides important lessons. The nature of the plaintiffs suggests
that the overwhelming majority of claims are contract claims. Together,
Housing, Medical, Finance, and Business-Other account for roughly
70%–80% of all claims, and individuals (other than landlords) account for
less than 10% of all claims. 
Medical-service providers filed between 18%–23% of all filings in my
sample. This percentage is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s findings
that roughly 18% of all judgments are in favor of medical plaintiffs.267
Medical-service providers have received a great deal of criticism in recent
years for aggressive collection techniques, including lawsuits.  Because268
I have only court filing records, I cannot determine if medical-service
providers are more likely to sue than other creditors. I can, however, ask
whether they are more likely to aggressively pursue their judgments,
which I do in Part IV.C.3.269
Some of the conclusions below are based on a sample of paper records
collected from the Richmond general district court. Table IV.4 suggests
that these results should be interpreted with caution because Richmond is
not necessarily representative of the state as a whole. Recall from Table
III.1 that Richmond (district 13) has a dramatically higher filing rate than
every other general district court in Virginia. One reason for its unusual
filing rate is that it is the forum of choice of a major credit card issuer.
This credit card issuer accounted for 75 of the 87 credit card claims in
Richmond and for about 25% of all complaints in the Richmond sample.270
This does not completely account for Richmond’s unusually high filing
rate, however. Richmond’s civil filing rate is more than four times that of
the median district.271
Although a single credit card issuer plays a major role in Richmond’s
docket, credit card issuers do not appear to account for a substantial
portion of the civil filings in Virginia. By 2004, the credit card market was
relatively concentrated, with the top ten issuers accounting for almost 90%
of the market.  I therefore compared the list of issuers and their affiliates272
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chartindex/chart/ppartid.742195/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
273. In 1997, 1.25% (3 of 240) of the warrant in debt actions were brought by a single credit
card issuer; none of the other top ten credit card issuers appeared in my sample. In 2001, 4.21% (8
of 190) of warrants in debt were brought by the top ten credit card issuers; six of these were brought
by a single issuer. Because there are so few credit card issuers in the samples, the standard errors
of these estimates are high. For example, the 95% confidence interval for the 2001 sample is 1.35%
to 7.07%.
274. See Consumer Data, supra note 7, at 67 tbl.10.
275. See, e.g., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at 108, 119–21. 
276. See More Financial Distress, supra note 18, at 232.
277. See Caroline E. Mayer, As Debt Collectors Multiply, So Do Consumer Complaints,
WASH. POST, July 28, 2005, at A01.
278. For example, see the series of articles in the Boston Globe, supra note 157.
against the plaintiffs in my sample of filings from across Virginia. In 2005,
these ten credit card issuers brought only seven of the three hundred
claims in my sample (2.3%); six of these claims were brought by a single
issuer.  It is difficult to compare this result to the Federal Reserve273
studies, which combined credit card issuers with other lenders and large
retailers under the heading “creditor.” Because the “creditor” heading
accounted for 25.4% of all judgments,  it is at least plausible that the274
paucity of credit card judgments generalizes to other states. The relative
absence of credit card issuers contrasts sharply with the focus on these
lenders in the recent consumer bankruptcy literature. A number of scholars
have pointed to the growth in credit card debt as a major cause of the
increase in the bankruptcy filing rate.  Using 2001 data, Sullivan,275
Warren, and Westbrook found that about half of all non-mortgage debt (by
value) in their sample was credit card debt.276
One possible explanation for the lack of credit card debt in the sample
is that credit card issuers may sell their distressed debt, and these debt
buyers sue. Despite the expansion in the market for distressed consumer
debt  and the reputation of these debt buyers for aggressive collection277
techniques,  I find that relatively few suits are brought by distressed-debt278
buyers. I focus solely on warrants in debt and motions for judgment
because these are the claims that would plausibly be filed by a buyer of
distressed credit card debt.
I test for the presence of distressed-debt buyers in two ways. The
electronic records contain a field in which the plaintiff must list the
original assignor of the debt, if any. The first row of Table IV.5 presents
the results using this measure. To the extent that the plaintiff neglects to
list the assignor on the complaint or the court neglects to enter the assignor
in the proper field in the electronic records, this first measure will
understate the degree of assignment. On the other hand, this measure may
overstate the presence of distressed-debt buyers in my sample because
some assignments are made to a related party or are made long before the
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279. In 1997, there were just seven assignments disclosed. Three of these assignments were
from one bank to another bank that acquired the first bank’s credit card business. Another
assignment was from Sprint Cellular to Sprint Corporation. The fifth assignment was from an
individual to a bank, and a sixth was from an individual to a hospital. Only one assignment even
remotely resembled the typical model of a distressed-debt buyer: a satellite television company
assigned its claim to a bank. In 2001, two of the eight assignments were probably not related to the
purchase of distressed debt. One assignment was from Discover Financial Services to Discover
Bank, and another assignment was from a hospital to a nursing school. All nine of the assignments
in 2005 were to plausible distressed-debt buyers.
280. See Michelle Molnar & Diane Alaimo, Top of the Heap, COLLECTIONS & CREDIT RISK,
Nov. 1999, at 46, 48–50 (listing the top fifty collection agencies, collectors of consumer debt, and
collectors of commercial debt for 1998); Debt Connection, Listing for Debt Buyers,
http://www.debtconnection.com/debtbuyers.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2007); Credit-Repair Central,
“Junk Debt Buyers”: Beware of These Questionable Collection Agencies, http://www.credit-
repaircentral.com/junkdebtbuyers.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2007); Credit Assistance Network,
About Junk Debt Buyers, http://www.expert-credit-advice.com/junk_debt.htm (last visited Nov.
1 6 ,  2 0 0 7 ) ;  D B A I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  2 0 0 6  C o n fe r e n c e  A t t e n d e e  L i s t ,
http://www.dbainternational.org/confInfo/2006_conf_attendees.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
281. For data used in this Table, see supra notes 247–48, 279–80 and accompanying text.
282. See Consumer Data, supra note 7, at 67 tbl.10.
283. See supra note 282 and accompanying text (noting that 9.2% of judgments are in favor
of collection agents); supra note 273 and accompanying text (noting that 2.3% of the claims in the
debt becomes distressed.  To correct for these problems, I offer a279
different measure. The second row includes all plaintiffs that (i) are listed
as a debt buyer in one of a number of industry surveys  or (ii) contain the280
words “recovery” or “receivables” in their name. The second row excludes
assignments that were obviously not credit card debt or were obviously
between related parties.
Table IV.5: Percent of Warrant in Debt Claims by
Assignees—Electronic Records281
1997 2001 2005
Assignment reported in electronic records 2.9% (7 of 240) 3.9% (15 of 380) 5.9% (22 of 371)
“Distressed-debt-buyer” 0 5.8% (22 of 380) 8.6% (32 of 371)
Regardless of the measure, the proportion of warrants in debt that are
brought by distressed-debt buyers remains relatively low (under 10%),
though this percentage is increasing. My estimates are somewhat
consistent with the Federal Reserve’s finding that only 9.2% of judgments
in the credit records were in favor of collection agents.  The apparent282
lack of credit card filings is consistent with several theories discussed in
Part I. However, I do not have a sample of defaults that did not lead to a
suit, so I cannot test whether credit card issuers are less likely to sue. In
addition, the relatively small percentage of suits brought by credit card
issuers and collections agents still translates into a fairly large number of
suits. If I assume that 11.5% (9.2% + 2.3%)  of the 2005 warrants in debt283
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study were brought by credit card issuers).
284. See supra Table IV.3 (listing warrants in debt as 61.8% of the complaints in the study).
285. See supra Table IV.1 (listing Virginia’s total general district court filings as 672,001).
286. Bankruptcy Filings by State 2000–2006, supra note 135.
287. I am deliberately overinclusive. I include as a match any name that is not inconsistent.
For example, if my original was “John Smith,” I include both “John Smith” and “John A. Smith.”
If there are listings for both “John A. Smith” and “John B. Smith,” I include the name with the
higher number of filings.
were brought by these creditors and that 62%  of complaints  were284 285
warrants in debt, then 47,914 warrants in debt were filed by credit card
issuers and collection agencies. This is roughly equivalent to the 44,621
non-business bankruptcies filed by Virginians in that year.  Some of the286
“missing” suits may simply reflect the extremely large number of filings
from other creditors.
3.  Few Filings Name the Same Defendant
Consumers who default on one obligation may have difficulty paying
their other bills, and so one might expect that most civil defendants will
be sued many times. Table IV.6 presents an attempt to estimate whether
a small number of defendants are responsible for a large number of
Virginia’s filings. I searched the electronic court records for other
complaints filed in 2001 against the individuals in my 2001 sample. The
Virginia courts database presents filings by county, so I searched
Richmond and the county where the defendant was originally sued. This
search contains false positives to the extent that two different individuals
with the same name (“John Smith”)  were sued. It also contains false287
negatives to the extent that an individual is sued in two different counties
(other than Richmond). Therefore, Table IV.6 is intended to provide a
rough estimate of the frequency of multiple suits against the same
defendant.
Table IV.6:  Other Filings Against Same Name in 2001 in Same
County or Richmond
# of
Other
Filings
Debt, Motion for
Judgment, and Detinue Unlawful Detainer All Other
0 83 15 13
1 22 11 2
2 9 6 2
3 5 2 1
4 3 4 0
5 0 2 0
6+ 2 (6, 6) 4 (7, 8, 11, 12) 2 (10, 15)
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288. See More Financial Distress, supra note 18, at 229 fig.5.
289. See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 130.
290. The statistics in Table IV.7 exclude filings transferred to another venue or appealed. For
data used in this Table, see supra notes 247–48.
291. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-77 (2007).
292. See Consumer Data, supra note 7, at 67 tbl.10.
Table IV.6 suggests that relatively few debtors have more than one or
two suits filed against them in a single year, and many of the records of
multiple suits in Table IV.6 arise out of an ongoing dispute between the
same parties. Consider, for example, the two names that had more than ten
matches. Each was a warrant in unlawful detainer (landlord–tenant), and
in each case all but one of the other filings were warrants in unlawful
detainer filed by the same plaintiff. 
4.  Most Judgments Are Relatively Small
Part I suggests that most judgments should be small relative to amounts
owed by bankrupt debtors. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook report that
the median unsecured debt of bankruptcy consumers in 2001 was
$20,276,  which is $22,360 in 2005 dollars.  The court records do not288 289
allow a direct comparison because they do not reveal the total amount that
the debtor owes, only the amount of one particular judgment. Moreover,
the court records do not list the amount of the original claim, only the
amount of actual judgments. Table IV.7 suggests that about 60% of
warrant in debt complaints result in a judgment.
Table IV.7: Percent of Claims Resulting in Judgment290
1997 2001 2005
Debt 60.7% (145 of 239) 60.3% (226 of 375) 60.4% (223 of 369)
Unlawful Detainer 49.4% (42 of 85) 54.0% (67 of 124) 48.6% (71 of 146)
Detinue 80.0% (12 of 15) 31.8% (7 of 22) 40.9% (9 of 22)
M otion for Judgment 47.6% (10 of 21) 57.9% (11 of 19) 68.2% (15 of 22)
 
Although plaintiffs could have sued for up to $15,000 in general
district court,  half of the 2005 warrant in debt judgments were less than291
$895. Even claims by financial institutions had a median value of just
$1,849. A significant number of judgments were for much smaller
amounts. About one-fourth of the warrant in debt judgments in 2005 were
for less than $300. These findings are consistent with those of the Federal
Reserve studies discussed above. The Federal Reserve found that the
median value for all judgments and the median value of five of its six
categories of judgments (Medical, Utility, Government, Collection
Agency, and Other) was between $500 and $1,000.  “Creditor”292
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293. Id.
294. For data used in this Table, see supra notes 247–48.
295. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
judgments were somewhat larger, with a median between $1,001 and
$5,000.293
Table IV.8: Average (Median) Judgment—2005 Dollars294
1997 2001 2005
Detinue $1,364 ($538) $1,143 ($884) $1,332 ($1,134)
M otion for Judgment $601 ($489) $364 ($183) $404 ($200)
Warrant in Debt $1,631 ($550) $1,711 ($701) $2,029 ($685)
M edical $554 ($428) $1,092 ($525) $1,464 ($501)
Finance $3,545 ($1,967) $2,879 ($1,109) $2,543 ($1,189)
Business-Other $1,204 ($798) $1,194 ($609) $2,286 ($1,134)
Government $558 ($164) $251 ($171) $403 ($281)
C.  Most Judgments Are Not Satisfied, but Most Debtors Do Not File
for Bankruptcy
Tables IV.6 and IV.8 suggest that most civil defendants have just one
judgment entered against them in a given year and that most of these
judgments are for less than $1,000. According to court records, however,
the vast majority of these judgments are never paid. Despite the existence
of these unpaid judgments, very few of the debtors in my sample sought
bankruptcy protection. Virginia general district court judgments do not
expire for ten years, and the creditor can renew the judgment as long as it
likes.  However, after two years have passed since the unpaid judgment295
has been entered, very little collection activity occurs. It appears that either
the rate of repayment is drastically understated or many debtors have
achieved an informal discharge of their debt.
1.  Most Judgments Are Not Satisfied
It is perhaps too soon to expect the 2005 judgments to have been
satisfied, so consider the judgments entered in 2001. Although the
plaintiffs have had five years to collect their judgments, less than one-
fourth of their judgments were reported as paid in full as of the end of
2006. In addition, very few judgments are repaid after the first two years,
suggesting that it is unlikely that the repayment rate for these judgments
will rise substantially.
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296. For data used in this Table, see supra notes 247–48.
297. About half of the records from 1997 that were marked satisfied had no satisfaction date.
298. See Consumer Data, supra note 7, at 67 tbl.10.
299. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 17, at 246.
300. Id.
301. The Lexis databases used were VA Bankruptcy Filings (VABKT) and VA Bankruptcy
Filings (Archive) (VAABKT).
Table IV.9: Satisfaction of Judgments296
1997 2001 2005
Percent of all judgments satisfied 20.3% 23.3% 15.7%
Excluding unlawful detainer and “other” 22.8% 27.3% 16.2%
Of those satisfied, percent satisfied within 2 years n /a 77.5% n/a297
The Federal Reserve study discussed above finds an even lower rate of
judgment satisfaction (15.8%).  Of course, both data sets rely on the298
accuracy of court records, and the court records generally rely on the
plaintiff to report when a judgment has been paid. The true rate of
payment is undoubtedly higher than the rate reported in the case files, but
it is very difficult to estimate the extent of the difference. However,
Professor Caplovitz’s study from the early 1970s provides some support
for the proposition that a substantial portion of judgments will go unpaid.
In a survey of debtors who were sued in 1967 for defaulting on a consumer
loan, Professor Caplovitz finds that only 22% reported paying their debt
in full and 38% reported making some payments.  Forty percent reported299
making no payments at all.  300
2.  Few Judgment Debtors File for Bankruptcy
Although the court records suggest that most judgments remain unpaid,
the overwhelming majority of defendants in my sample did not file for
bankruptcy. Table IV.10 presents the results of a comparison of my
records with the Virginia bankruptcy filing database maintained by
Lexis.  Searching the electronic records creates a significant risk of false301
positives; I do not know if a “John Smith” in the Lexis bankruptcy
database is the same “John Smith” sued in state court. This risk is
mitigated by searching only for names containing a middle name or
middle initial. However, I count as a match any bankruptcy record that
lacks an inconsistent middle name or initial. For example, if the civil filing
record lists “John A. Smith,” a bankruptcy filing by “John Smith” would
be a match, but a bankruptcy filing by “John B. Smith” would not be a
match. Some of the Richmond paper records allow me to avoid this
problem because they list the debtor’s social security number on the
complaint, and I can compare the first five digits of these social security
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302. For data used in this Table, see supra notes 247–48, 301.
303. The total is less than the sum of the prior rows because some records returned multiple
bankruptcies.
304. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 17, at 274.
numbers to the numbers listed in the Lexis databases. This sample is
unlikely to be representative of the state’s filings as a whole, however.
Filings that included the defendant’s social security number were almost
exclusively made by financial institutions or the government.
Table IV.10: Number of Debtors Who Filed for Bankruptcy After
Judgment302
All Judgments Unpaid Judgments
Electronic Richmond Electronic Richmond
Never filed 47 78 37 44
Filed prior to 2001 10 13 7 7
Filed from 2001 to 2003 6 9 3 5
Filed from 2004 to 2006 4 2 3 1
Total searched 61 108 49 57303
Less than 10% of the names in my electronic sample from 2001 appear
in the Lexis bankruptcy database between January 1, 2001, and December
31, 2003. Even if I expand my bankruptcy filing period to the end of 2006,
this percentage increases to only 16.4%. Limiting the sample to those
debtors with unpaid judgments actually causes the percentage to fall
slightly to just 12.2%. Though surprising, these results corroborate
Professor Caplovitz’s survey of consumers sued in 1967; he found that just
7% filed for bankruptcy.  304
3.  Post-Judgment Actions Are Surprisingly Limited
The data suggest that many debtors fail to repay their judgments but do
not seek bankruptcy protection. Therefore, these debtors are vulnerable to
garnishment or other collection efforts for a potentially unlimited amount
of time. I cannot observe all of the techniques that creditors may employ
to enforce their judgments; I can observe only the rate at which creditors
bring subsequent proceedings, such as garnishments and interrogatories.
Table IV.11 suggests that the overwhelming majority of subsequent
proceedings are garnishment proceedings.
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305. For data used in this Table, see supra notes 247–48.
306. For data used in this Table, see supra notes 247–48.
307. For data used in this Table, see supra notes 247–48.
Table IV.11: Distribution of Subsequent Filings305
1997 2001 2005
Garnishment 87 132 88
Interrogatory 17 29 11
Show Cause 2 8 1
Capias 0 0 0
Other 1 6 3
Total 107 175 103
Perhaps the most significant facts about the subsequent proceedings are
that there are relatively few of them and creditors seem to cease bringing
these actions fairly soon after the judgment is entered. Table IV.12
presents the total number of subsequent actions per unpaid judgment, and
Table IV.13 presents the time from the initial judgment to the last
collection proceeding in the file. 
Table IV.12: Subsequent Actions per Unpaid Judgment (Excluding
Unlawful Detainer and Other)306
1997 2001 2005
0 95 129 158
1 22 29 41
2 7 12 6
3 1 3 4
4 1 3 0
5–7 3 2 0
8–10 0 0 0
10+ 0 0 0
Table IV.13: Time from Last Hearing to Last Recorded Collection
Action to Collect Unpaid Judgment (Excluding Unlawful Detainer and
Other)307
1997 2001
No subsequent actions 95 129
Less than 1 year 21 25
1 to 2 years 8 15
2 to 3 years 4 4
3 to 4 years 0 3
M ore than 4 years 1 2
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308. The omitted dummy variable represents judgments entered in 2005. The results are more
dramatic if I focus solely on 1997 or on 2001. In each case the finance creditors are more than twice
as likely to either attempt to collect or actually collect their judgments.
309. If I restrict my sample to unpaid judgments, finance creditors are 1.75 times more likely
to institute subsequent proceedings.
310. For statistics used in this Table, see supra notes 247–48 & 308–09.
The analysis in Part I suggests that financial creditors should behave
differently than other plaintiffs. In particular, these financial creditors
should be more likely to actually collect their judgments or to at least
attempt to enforce the judgments that they obtain. I test this theory by
examining the collection of the judgments entered in each of the three
years of my study. Because medical creditors have received harsh
criticism for aggressive collection techniques, I also test whether they are
more likely to use subsequent proceedings to enforce their judgments. I
control for fixed-year effects  and the size of the judgment. Financial308
creditors are almost twice as likely either to collect or to begin subsequent
proceedings to try to collect their judgments than other creditors
(individuals, lawyers, other business, and government), and this effect is
statistically significant.  The odds ratio for medical plaintiffs is a little309
less than one, but this effect is not statistically significant. The fixed-year
effects are not statistically significant. 
Table IV.14: Likelihood of Subsequent Proceeding or Actual
Satisfaction of Judgment310
Variable Odds Ratio Pr>|z|
1997 Judgment 0.76 0. 32
2001 Judgment 1.39 0. 22
Finance 1.86 0. 05
M edical 0.84 0. 78
Judgment Amount 1.00 0. 38
Judgment Amount Squared 1.00 0. 29
Observations 106
Pseudo R-sq 0.04
4.  Are Many Civil Defendants Judgment Proof?
One explanation for the relatively low rate of judgment satisfaction and
the unwillingness of many creditors to actively enforce their judgments is
that a very large proportion of the civil defendants are effectively
judgment proof. Part III supports this theory—Virginia’s civil litigation is
concentrated in areas with a greater proportion of disadvantaged
individuals. This Part provides further support for this theory by showing
a relatively low homeownership rate among civil defendants.
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311. Richmond,  Va. ,  Ci ty Assessor ’ s  Off ice,  Proper ty Search ,
http://eservices.ci.richmond.va.us/applications/propertysearch/frmMainSearch.aspx (last visited
Nov. 16, 2007).
312. If I exclude warrants in unlawful detainer, this percentage rises to 23.2%.
313. U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Statistics: 2004, Homeownership Rates by State: 1984 to
2004, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual04/ann04t13.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2007).
314. U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Statistics: 2001, Homeownership Rates for the 75 Largest
Metropolitan Areas: 1986 to 2001, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual01/ann01
t14.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
315. See supra Table IV.1.
316. See Am. Bankr. Inst., supra note 2.
317. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified throughout 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101–1532 (West
2007)).
318. See FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at 238.
319. This term is taken from Dawsey & Ausubel, supra note 4, at 2.
320. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
Civil filings do not disclose whether the defendant owns a home, and
the electronic records do not disclose even the defendant’s address.
However, the paper records list the defendant’s address, and Richmond
places property tax records on the Internet.  I compared the paper records311
of filings made in the Richmond general district court against these
property tax records to determine if the defendant owned the property
listed as his or her address in 2001, the year of the suit. Less than 14% of
the defendants owned their homes,  well below the state average of312
75.1%  and the Richmond average of 76.2%.  This does not mean that313 314
very few homeowners are sued in state court. Even if the 14%
homeownership rate applies statewide, this would still translate into more
than 100,000 civil suits in 2001.  315
VI.  CONCLUSION
In 1980, Americans filed 287,570 non-business bankruptcies; by 2005,
this number had grown to 2,039,214.  These stark statistics fueled a316
decade-long fight over bankruptcy reform that ultimately culminated in the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.317
These statistics also led to a boom in bankruptcy scholarship that has
taught us a great deal about bankrupt debtors. One of the prominent
lessons of this scholarship is that bankrupt debtors are drawn almost
exclusively from the middle class, and prior scholars concluded that
financial distress is a “middle-class pathology.”318
If financial distress is a middle-class pathology, it is not exclusively so.
A focus on bankruptcy has obscured the fact that defaulting consumers can
simply refuse to pay. We do not know precisely how many Americans
choose this “informal bankruptcy” system,  but the data suggest that they319
may easily outnumber the bankrupt debtors.  This Article analyzes state320
court civil filings to get a sense of how many Americans default without
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choosing bankruptcy, and the numbers are staggering. Virginia alone has
averaged more than one million civil filings a year for more than the last
twenty years,  and the overwhelming majority of these filings seek to321
collect debts from consumers.
This Article also finds that civil defendants and bankrupt defendants
differ in predictable ways. Stated simply, the bankrupt debtors are those
debtors who have something to protect. Thus, limiting our focus to
bankruptcy not only causes us to underestimate financial distress
generally, but the defaulting and insolvent Americans whom we overlook
are the most disadvantaged members of our society. The implications of
this Article are not entirely grim, however. While the bankruptcy filing
rate has risen dramatically over the past few decades, the rate of civil
litigation appears to have changed very little. 
The debate over consumer bankruptcy reform will certainly continue.
This debate must consider what, if anything, should be done to encourage
the consumers who have chosen informal bankruptcy to choose instead to
repay their debts or to file a bankruptcy petition. An informed answer to
this question requires information about the financial condition of these
debtors that we do not yet have. However, if we wish to understand default
and insolvency, we cannot restrict ourselves to the bankruptcy courts
merely because the light is brighter.
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